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In 1903, Thomas Welsh explored what he called "contrasts in African 
legislationn in an article in the Journal of the African Society. What particularly 
int~igued Welsh were some of the difTerences in the law governing the sale of alcohol 
to Africans in various parts of the empire. More specifically, why was it that there 
should be one law for the thirty years old colony of Lagos and another, radically 
different, for the recently acquired Transvaal territory? "Now, what puzzles onet1, 
wmte Welsh, "is why the 'coloured person1 on the West Coast of Africa should get as 
much absolute alcohol as he liked ... while the one in the Transvaal gets clapped 
into gaol if he procmes a glass of beer or spirits .. .?l1 (1) 
Welsh's question of over 70 years ago was only partly rhetorical, and it 
deserved an answer from the imperial authorities of the time. It still merits a 
serious reply from the historians and sociologists of colonialism. For, underlying 
Welsh's seemingly superficial query, are several issues of considerable interest to 
scholars. Who advocated colonial liquor legislation and who benefited from it? What 
principles governed these decisions and how and when were they arrived at? Why did 
the imperialists adopt different strategies of social control in various parts of 
Africa? 
This paper will not attempt to answer these questions within the framework 
of a comparative study embracing Lagos and the Transvaal. To do that would require a 
lengthy and sophisticated examination of the differences between mercantile and 
industrial capital when, on the one hand, it seeks to exploit peasant producers spread 
throughout the countryside W, on the other, a working class concentrated in urban 
areas. Instead, this analysis will be largely confined to the Transvaal. It will 
seek to answer some of the questions raised, and to demonstrate the complex 
interaction between alcohol, black workers and capitalism during the period between 
l886 and 1903. 
The Black Worker as Consumer: the Rise of the Liquor Industry, 1881-1896 
On the 4th October 1881, the Volksraad of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek 
(ZAR) passed article 44. This granted a Hungarian mining engineer, Alois Hugho 
Nellmapius, a concession "for the sole right to manufacture from grain, potatoes, and 
other products growable in the Transvaal, excepting tree-fdts and grapes, and the 
right to sell in bulk and bottle free of licence" such spirits. (2) Nellmapius, a 
close friend of State President Kruger, was granted this original concession for a 
period of fifteep years, on condition that the distillery was operational by at least 
the 1st of July 1882. (3) Weeks before this, however, on 7th June 1882, Nellmapius, 
in return for a 20% share, ceded the concession to a partnership comprising himself, 
the cousins Isaac and Barnet Lewis, and Barnet's brothesin-law - Sa,unny Marks. (4) It 
was this partnership which gave birth to De Eerste Fabrieken in de Zuid Afrikaansche 
Republiek Ltd, and in June 1883 a proud President Kruger personally opened the new 
distillery and christened it "Volk~hoop~~ . 
A director of the distillery at a later date, Hugh Crawford, was therefore 
largely correct when he noted that: "The distillery was established, and its 
operations commenced before the goldfields of either Barbeton or the Transvaal were 
discovered, and at a time when the country was poor, its population small, and business 
very limited. (5) These early business realities, however, did not prevent the 
Volksraad from continuing to perceive the factory as llVolkshoopll. As the economic 
climate in the Transvaal changed in the mid-1800s, so the llhoopv of the tlvolkt' grew. 
When asked to modify and confirm the terms of the concession on 23rd June 1885, 
members of the Raad took the opportunity to make additional demands for development. 
In return for extending the monopoly for a period of thirty years, until 30th June 
1912, they insisted on the statets receiving an annual payment of 81,000 and a guarantee 
that a glass factory and cooperage works would be erected at the factory. (6) In 
return, the company was to continue to benefit from an exemption from any other form 
of taxation. 
These additional development requirements specified by the Volksraad 
extended the companyts resources - none more so than the glass factory,which was 
ultimately constructed only in 1894. (7) The dramatically changed economic conditions 
in the Transvaal from the mid-1880s, however, assisted the compaqy. In particular, 
the rapid growth and development of the Witwatersrand goldfields transformed the 
likelihood of business success for "Volkshoop" from probability to certainty. In May 
1889 it was noted of the distillery that, from "a very modest beginning on a tentative 
scale, its success has become unprecedently rapid, and it is now developing itself into 
a great industry". (8) 
The tangible proof of the emergence of a "great industryt1 was to be found on 
the 4,000 acre site of the distillery on the banks of the Pienaars river, some 10 miles 
east of Pretoria. On what was formerly S- Marks's Hat2ierley farm there arose a 
reservoir with a capacity of l70,OOO gallons of water, a thirty-horse-power plant for 
electricity generation, a fo~storey central distillation plant, a boarding house for 
accommodating white workers, houses for married European employees, and suitably 
prestigious separate house for the distillery manager. (9) The buildings most likely 
to attract the attention of the Transvaal burghers, however, were the three large grain 
stores, each with a capacity of 5,000 bags. These stores, and indeed the entire 
factory site, could be viewed from managing director Marksls "splendid residencet1 some 
1% miles away at Zwartkoppies. (10) 
By 1889-90, the factory had in its employment at least fifty white and over 
one hundred Afxican workers. (11) In mid-December 1889, the German distillation plant 
was working at full capacity and. pmducing 1,000 gallons of proof spirit per day from 
grain supplied exclusively by Transvaal burghers. Even this output, however, was 
insufficient to maintain stocks, and the management embarked on a programme of 
expansion. (12) New boilers, kilns, malting floors, stills and storage space were all 
being added to the fabtory when a fire bmke out and disrupted production in mid- 
December 1889. (13) 
The setback caused by the fire proved less serious than it might have been 
and the company merely lost two months' production. What concerned Marks and his 
colleagues more, however, was the fact that the distillery had been left uninsured 
and that the fire was considered to be the work of an arsonist. (14) The owners of 
the factory were sufficiently convinced of this theory to offer "a £2,000 reward for 
the apprehension and conviction of the person or persons implicated in this fiendish 
act". (15) In the months after the fire the reward remained unclaimed, the 
distillery was insured, and the owners took the opportunity of making a change in the 
factory management. Thomas Strachan, a man with experience "at one of the largest 
distilleries in the world", replaced the previous manager, Stokes. (16) Under 
Strachan1s management the business experienced steady improvement and expansion. The 
resources of the company were again stretched, however, when a second fire broke out 
in the four-storey distillery building on the 29th M a ~ r  1891. But, since the plant 
had been insured for £6,000 and the maturing stock carefully isolated from the 
distillery proper, the effect of the fire was again perhaps less serious than it 
mi&t have been. (17) 
Nevertheless, these setbacks, when combined with the excellent prospects of 
the company and the need for expansion, left De Eerste Fabrieken in de Zuid Afrikaansche 
Republiek Beperk relatively starved of badly needed capital. Marks1s solution to this 
problem was to allow the company to go public. In November 1892, in exchange for 
£122,000 rwd shares, the holders of the concession made it over to Eerste Fabrieken 
Hatherley Distillery Limited. (18) With the advantage of a listing on the London 
Stock Bkchange, Hatherley Distillery was able to attract international as well as 
national capital, and the company was on the threshold of a period of spectacular 
expansion. 
Seldom, if ever, could ambitious plans for industrial expansion have been 
launched into a safer or more sympathetic business environment. What more could 
capitalists ask for than a government-granted monopoly in a rapidly expanding market? 
As the sole local producer of cheap spirits for African consumption, Hatherley 
Distillery found itself catering for a market of 14,000 black miners in 1890, 
88,000 in 1897, and an enomous 100,000 by 1899. Privileged access to a market that 
expanded by nearly ten times in as many years was an important part of the Hatherley 
success story. 
It was not only the size of Hatherleyfs market that was important, but its 
quality. In particular, the fact that the majority of the 100,000 strong work-force 
was drawn from Mozambique was of the utmost importance. For at least several decades 
prior to the industrialization of the Witwatersrand the peasants and workers of 
Mozambique had been sold large quantities of wine and spirits - inferior quality 
alcohol that flowed from the vats and economy of metropolitan Portugal.. There is 
substantial evidence to show that the more proletarianized Africans of southern rural 
Mozambique, and the black workers of the urban areas along the coast, were 
considerably addicted to alcohol by the early 1890s. (19) In 1894,. the British 
consul in Mozambique, W. A. Churchill, noted how large quantities of spirits were 
sold in "up country storesw, and that black workers "spent the greater part of their 
wages in alcohol, known as Kaffir rum1 . (20) In the following year, Churchill 
noted in his annual report that landing agents often experienced the greatest 
difficulty in finding sober black workers in the ports. This problem became so well 
known that ships from South Africa brought their own African dockers with them, to 
off-load cargo in the Mozambique ports. (21) 
The link between black alcohol consumption in Mozambique and African miners 
on the Witwatersrand was also clear to observers in the 1890s. The syndrome of rural 
underdevelopment and peasant indebtedness meant that the canteens of the countryside 
were invariably good r e c ~ t i n g  grounds for the Transvaal labour agents. (22) The 
more proletarianized status, as well as the poverty of an isidakewa (drunkard), were 
easily recognizable on the mines: "In a store where the boys! belongings were handing 
a drunkard1 S sack was generally noticeable by its age, and leanness of aspect." (23) 
Similarly, African miners returning to Mozambique were at least as likely to be 
carrying back gas piping for use in domestic distilleries, as they were to be taking 
a gun. (24) All of this meant that the Pretoria Distillery was not only catering for 
an expanding market but for one in which the largest percentage of consumers already 
had a well developed liking, if not addiction, to its product. Every black worker 
on the Rand mines was a potential consumer of Hatherley products. Every African 
consumer who spent his income on Hatherley products was set for entry into the 
working class. In the 1890s the black worker was a consumer, and the fact that he 
was a consumer enhanced the chances of his remaining a worker - as opposed to a 
migrant labourer operating from a peasant-based economy. 
Not many of these market realities escaped the attention of investors when 
the Hatherley Company went public late in 1892 and £350,000 worth of £l shares became 
available. (25) As possibly the only other large-scale investment opportunity in a 
Transvaal industry, the Distillery attracted local mining capital that sou&t to 
spread and diversify its holdings. A significant proportion of the shares were 
subscribed to by South African mining capitalists, and throughout the 1890s the 
depth and extent of their holdings were reflected in the directorships of the company. 
Besides S- Marks, the board of Hatherley Distillery during the 1890s included, at 
various stages, the following mining capitalists: J. N. De Jo- (Ekecutive Member 
of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines 1897-1909, President of the Chamber 1906-07), 
S. Evans (mine manager, associated with Eckstein & CO after 1898 and made a full 
partner in l902), L. Ehrlich (before 1894 director of the Ferreira, Modderfontein, 
Knights, Wolhuter, Main Reef and other Transvaal companies of the S. Newmm G~OUP), 
and A. Epler (Ekecutive Member of the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines 1899-1909, and 
later Managing Director of Transvaal Goldfields ~td) . (26) 
Were national capital went successfully, international capital was not long 
to follow, and Hatherley also had a significant number of English, French, Austrian 
and German shareholders. (27) The interests of these European investors were 
safeguarded by individual members of the Hatherley board, who acted as the agents of 
international capitalism. Director J. H. Curle (Mining Correspondent for the 
~conomist ) held an informal brief for English shareholders, while the Bavarian 
Ludwig Ehlich looked after the interest of German investors. During the 1890s the 
Austrian Adolf Epler undertook this task, not only at Hatherley but in other concerns 
as well, and was candidly described as "a representative of Foreign Capital in South 
Africa1'. (28) The French investors in the Distillery looked for their protection to 
yet another director, Henri Duval, who was also the manager of the Banque Frangaise 
de llAfrique du Sud in Johannesburg. (29) 
With the benefit of some of the most astute managerial talent available in 
the Transvaal, and the financial muscle power provided by national and international 
capital, Hatherley Distillery set course for a period of spectacular development 
between 1893 and 1896. This expansion is clearly evident from Table A. (30) 
Eerste Fabrieken Hatherley Distillery Limited, 1893-1899 
Yeax 
-
Gallons sold Net profit or loss Dividend declared 
During the early 1890s in particular, Hatherley Distillery was the undisputed master 
of the Witwatersrand liquor market. 
Any industry which could yield dividends raaging from 1% to 200/0, however, 
was likely to attract the envious attention of competitors, and the large new market 
in the Transvaal had not passed without notice amongst other spirit producers. In 
theory, Hatherley's monopolistic position was secure. Besides being the sole producer 
of grain spirits in the ZAR, the company, through its privileged exemption from 
excise duty, was in a position to undercut any imported spirits. "Cape Smoke", for 
example, the notorious cheap brandy produced in the Western Province, could not 
compete on the Rand market because of the hi& import duties. (31) Through diligent 
reading of the small print in inter-state treaties, however, one group of spirit 
producers in southern Africa= find a weakness through which they could attack 
Hatherley Distillery's dominant position. The Treaty of Commerce entered into by the 
Transvaal and Portugal in 1875, ratified in Pretoria in 1882, and due to expire in 
1902, made provision for the produce of Portugal to enter the ZAR free of duty. (32) 
It was this chink in the legal amour of Kmgerts Republic that producers in 
Mozambique exploited fully in the mid-1890s. After 1894, and more especially after 
1895, once the railway line from Delagoa Bay to the Witwatersrand had been opened, 
Hatherleyls firm hold on the Transvaal market was seriously undermined by cheaper 
spirits that originated from two very different sources. (33) 
First, rum, "which was distilled at a fraction of the cost at which grain 
spirit is producedw, under cut Hatherley products. (34) In Mozambique, producers, 
such as the Companhia do Assucar de Mogambique, turned their attention to the profits 
that could be made from rum distillation. In 1894 the companhials distillery at Mopea 
specifically produced 5,000 gallons of run for the Rand market. (35) The following 
year saw such an expansion in the manufacture of run that the companhia exhausted its 
supplies of sugar. (36) With excess distillation capacity on hand, the Companhia do 
Assucar approached the Portuguese government for permission to import additional 
quantities of sugar from Natal. (37) The fact that the president of the companhia, 
Frederico Ressano Garcia, was also a minister in the Portuguese government no doubt 
helped ensure that this permission was granted. With members of the Portuguese 
ruling class personally involved in the manufacture of spirits, and the ZARls rail 
outlet to the sea at stake, it is perhaps not surprising that the Transvaal government 
did not object to this trade because of "high political considerations". (38) In the 
following years the companhia consistently manufactured spirits from sugar that was 
not only drawn from Mozambique but from Natal and Mauritius as well. (39) By 1896 
the companhia was still expanding rum production and sharpening its competitive edge 
throw price reductions - the latter being achieved throw the replacement of 
European personnel at the Mopea distillery with African artisans. (40) 
The pattern of expansion to be seen in the Companhia do Assucar's 
activities was repeated at other distilleries throughout Mozambique. In 1895 the 
distilleries of Portuguese East Africa exported 84,528 gallons of spirits to the 
South African Republic, in 1896 this rose to 255,157 gallons, in 1897 to 357,260 
gallons, and by 1898 it had reached 456,000 gallons. (41) This business bonanza, 
perhaps without precedence in the economic history of Mozambique, saw the ownership 
of several distilleries change hands. (42) New capital was attracted to distilleries 
that could produce alcohol at 3 shillings a gallon, and conmind a wholesale price of 
9 shillings a gallon on the Witwatersrand. (43) Profit margins of this order also 
warranted investment in new plant and equipment, and the large French company at 
Louren~o Wques, the Soci6t6 Frmgaise de DistillBrie, expanded its activities in 
1895. The company built a large new distillery on the banks of the Inkomati river, 
100 yards from the Transvaal frontier, at the border village of Ressano Garcia. (44) 
Again, this venture received the blessing of the Portuguese government. 
The second source of alcohol which undermined the sale of Hatherley grain 
spirits in the 1890s was Germany. So cheap were the German spirits that they even 
undercut the sugar based imports from Mozqmbique. (45) The story of how and why 
German potato spirits came to be sold to the black gold miners of the Transvaal 
reveals further features of the operation of international capitalism before the 
South African War. 
During the last three decades of the 19th century there was, for a variety 
of reasons, a substantial increase in the average yield of potatoes per acre, in 
Prussia and Germany. (46) This phenomenon was especially noticeable in the rye-and- 
potato econoqy to be found in the lighter soil areas of Prussia. (47) The increased 
yield, however, was something of a mixed blessing, since it came at a time when the 
consumption of the potato as a vegetable was declining in the domestic households of 
Prussia and Germany. 
The Junkers, confronted with an increased potato crop and a declining 
demand for the vegetable, decided to resolve the problem through the large scale 
distillation of potato spirits. In itself this decision was hardly startling - the 
commercial distillation of spirits from potatoes dated back to at least the 17th , 
century. What was new, however, was the sale of the operation and the specialized 
lldistillation domainf1 that came into being. (48) In addition, the feasibility of 
this solution had been guaranteed by the invention of a special steam apparatus for 
the mashing of silo potatoes in 1873. (49) Fundamentally, it was this invention 
which enabled potato spirits to be manufactured commercially, and which lay at the 
heart of the German distillation industry between 1870 and 1900. (50) 
The Junkers found, however, that their problems did not end with the 
large scale conversion of potatoes into spirits. From 1880 onwards, the domestic 
markets of Prussia and Germany showed an increasing preference for the superior 
quality alcohols that were being distilled from grain. By the 1890s producers were 
finding themselves with large stocks of potato spirits that sold extremely slowly 
in domestic European markets. It was largely for this reason that the producers 
anxiously so-t out the less discriminating colonial export markets, and Africa 
became the outlet for enormous quantities of potato spirits. (51) 
Because of the high import duties in the Transvaal, the German potato 
spirits could not penetrate the market directly - like "Cape Smoke", it simply would 
have ceased to be cheap if imported in the orthodox manner. Both Prussian producers 
avld Transvaal importers, therefore, had to find a around this problem if they 
wished to share in the profits that could be made in the ZAR. Well aware that this 
customs barrier had already proved itself vulnerable on the eastern border with 
Mozambique, international capitalists set themselves to work, weaving the sort of 
legal magic by which the potatoes of Prussia became converted into the "produce of 
Portugalf1. It was under this latter guise that thousands of gallons of German and 
Prussian potato spirits flooded into the Transvaal from 1894 onwards. 
It was in the port of Hamburg that German liners took on their cargoes of 
potato spirits during the 1890s. (52) From there they would fan out into two large 
southward-arcs that embraced the west and east coasts of Africa respectively. The 
German West Africa liners, Thekla Boben, Hausa, Bida and Ilorin, worked the Atlantic 
and discharged their cargoes in ports from Lagos in the north to Luanda in the 
south. (53) The ships of the German East Africa Line, however, worked with a slightly 
different routine. After taking on their cargoes, the liners Konig, Kanzler, Herzog, 
Admiral and Reichstag would first make for the port of Lisbon. There, they would lie 
overnight with their cargo of Prussian potato spirit. Then, after a suitable number 
of hours had elapsed, they would receive a certificate of naturalization from a port 
official and from then on the cargo would be considered the "produce of Portugal". (54) 
Thereafter, the ships would head eastwards through the Suez Canal, and then south into 
the Indian Ocean. In the 1890s the most important port of call on this southwards 
voyage was Louren~o Marques. It was there that the liners discharged the bulk of 
their cargo of potato spirit - spirit that was partly destined for local consumption 
within Mozambique, and partly for the Witwatersrand. (55) The extent of this traffic 
between 1894 and 1903 is evident from Table B, below. (56) 
TABU B 
Imports of Plain A~uardente through Lourenqo Marques, 1894-1903 
Year 
-
Quantity in Litres 
(~ote: Large quantities of the same "fire-water" were also off- 
loaded at the ports of Inhambane, Chinde and Quelimane. ) 
The Transvaal liquor consumer of the 1890s was thus likely to be drinking 
spirits that came from one of three basic sources: Hatherley, any one of several 
Mozambique distilleries, or Germany. Seen in another way, the consumer could, in 
order of declining cost, be drinking either grain, sugar or potato spirits. He would 
also, however, be drinking a good deal more than plain alcohol and, in terms of the 
cost to his health, he was likely to be paying a good bit more than he bargained for. 
Even in their I1puretl form, direct from the distilleries, these spirits contained a 
high proportion of amylic alcohol. This latter form of alcohol, also known as fusel 
oil, was a poisonous by-product of the fermentation process. Samples of Hamburg 
potato spirit taken in West Africa in 1902 revealed a proportion of fusel oil by 
weight which varied from 1.26% to 4.4%. (57) When a Transvaal chemist analysed 
spirits from the same source in 1895, he declared it to be "unfit for internal 
usef1. (58) Spirits that started their life as being unfit for human consumption in 
their "purev form did not improve markedly as they passed throrqfh the hands of various 
other intermediaries in the Transvaal. 
Most of the spirits that entered Johannesburg first found their way to the 
wholesalers, firms such as Meskin & Davidoff, Vogelman & Friedman, Kantor Ltd, 
T. Friedman Ltd, I. Herzfeld Ltd, or Blum & Co. (59) A couple of these firms, Kantor 
and Blum, dealt only in bulk supplies of spirits which they sold directly to smaller 
bottling concerns. (60) The majority, however, opted for the higher profits that 
could be made throw processing the raw spirits into the fiery commercial brands that 
seemed to satisfg the tastes of white and black consumers on the Rand. 
Firms involved in the processing business, such as Meskin & Davidoff, 
required three thin@ in addition to raw spirits: a large supply of bottles, various 
chemicals and essences, and a stock of forged cork tops and bottle labels. The first 
was obtained through the endless collection of "empties" from the canteens and back 
streets of Johannesburg. (61) It is also possible that at a later date some of these 
bottles were manufactured at the Hatherley glass works. The second was purchased from 
a local firm of wholesale chemists, P. J. Peterson & Co. (62) The third requisite, 
forged labels, were ordered from the firm responsible for printing the Standard and 
Diggers1 News - Matthew & Walker. These forgeries, often making use of well known 
brand names, suggested that spirits were manufactured in Holland, France, Scotland, 
etc. Several different forgeries were printed on a single sheet, and the customer 
could then cut out the label which he considered appropriate to his product. (63) 
Amed with these pre-requisites, the firms then set about manufacturing 
various brads of liquor, according to recipes that were fairly widely known in the 
trade. "Kaffir Brandy", price 16/6d per dozen bottles in 1899, was prepared 
according to the following formula: 15 gals. Delagoa proof spirit, 15 gals. water, 
1 gal. cayenne pepper tincture, %lb. mashed prunes, 1% ozs. sulphuric acid, and 1 oz. 
nitric ether. This "brandy" was coloured through the addition of a suitable 
quantity of burnt sugar. (64) "Kaffir WhisQ", price 14/6d per dozen bottles in 
1899, required the following ingredients: 100 gals. of Delagoa Bay proof spirits, 
1 gal. tincture of prunes, 3 lbs. glycerine, l pint green tea, 5 oz. acetic acid, 20 
drops creasote, and 12 drops oil of cognac. (65) "Dutch Gin for Kaffirsn, price 15/6d 
per dozen bottles in 1899, required the following: 100 gals. Delagoa Bay proof 
spirit, 1 gal. sugar syrup, 1 lb. tincture of orange peel, 4 ozs. turpentine, 1 oz. 
Juniper oil, and $ oz. oil of fennel. To this concoction was added bead without 
colouring (an additive that was partly composed of sulphuric acid), and then the 
entire quantity of "ginf1 was filtered through charcoal. (66) 
For the benefit of the European consumers in the working class some of the 
recipes were varied slightly and the processing was made a little more sophisticated. 
Whisky, for example, was prepared exactly the same way as "Kaffir Whiskyw, but was 
filtered more frequently. Further, a layer of oak sawdust, when available, was added 
to the whisky in order to impart to it a distinctive flavour. (67) The Transvaal 
Leader warned its Johannesburg readers in 1899: "Do not be a-st at the prospect of 
drinking suplhate of copper and green tea, acetic acid and oil of Neroli as Martellts 
Five Star Liqueur Brandy; you have done it often enough." (68) Basically, white and 
black workers were invited to drink the same poisonous concoctions. The white workers, 
however, were required to pay slightly more for their "refined" taste. Whereas 
"Kaffir Ginger Brandy" sold at 16/6d per dozen bottles, the same quantity of "White 
Ginger Brandy" cost 22/6d. (69) 
The fact that these different types of "liquor" were sold in vast quantities, 
at public places, was well known at the time. As early as April 1890, the Standard and 
Di~mrsl News devoted an entire editorial to the subject. It pointed out how, in a 
neighbouring colony (probably ~ozambique) , Hennessy and Martell's *** Brandy had been 
analysed and found to consist of: potato spirit, fuse1 oil, burnt sugar, spirits of 
nitre, and oil of cognac. The editorial continued: 
"We cannot prove that what is clrut& here as retailed 
is like these samples, but he would be a bold man who 
would bet on the purity of the liquor ordinarily 
retailed in Johannesburg. A public officer is 
absolutely needed to deal with such matters .l' (70) 
This plea for a public analyst fell upon deaf ears, as did further appeal two months 
later. (71) Although the liquor laws subsequently did make provision for the 
appointment of such a state officia1,there was still no public analyst in 1895, and by 
as late as 1898 the situation was still unremedied. (72) The government of the ZAR 
knew only too well that, if an analytical chemist started probing the composition of 
Rand liquor, the finger of guilt would point ultimately not only to the wholesalers in 
Johannesburg but to influential capitalists in Hamburg and Lisbon as well. That was 
a price which the Transvaal government was unwilling to pay. The liquor was thus 
allowed to pass unchallenged from the wholesalers to the retail outlets spread across 
the Witwatersrand - the canteens. 
There was no shortage of canteens in the industrializing republic. Of the 
393 licensed canteens in the Transvaal in September 1888, 147 had been granted in the 
more concentrated Witwatersrand area. (73) It is estimated that, at the zenith of 
the liquor trade in 1895, between 750 and 1,000 canteens could be found in the area 
between Xrugersdorp in the west and Nigel in the east. men by 1898, when the 
licensed retail liquor trade had declined considerably, there were 495 recognized 
outlets in the magisterial districts of Kiwgersdorp, Johannesburg and Boksburg, and 
in the same year the Licensing Board had to deal with 165 new applications. (74) 
Numerically significant from an early date, this petit bourgeoisie was quick 
to recognize its class interests and to organize accordingly. As early as 1888 the 
canteen-keepers in the various mining districts had got together to form the 
Witwatersrand Licensed Victuallers! Association (WLVA) . (75) By March 1890, WLVA had 
one hundred members, and the executive was considering the applications of forty 
prospective members. (76) As the prof essional association for liquor retailers, the 
WLVA undertook those functions that were normally expected of trade organizations. 
It protected members when their licences were threatened, it petitioned the state to 
liberalize the liquor laws in an attempt to expand the size of its legal market, and 
it sought to limit the numbers of those entering the retail trade. (77) While the 
canteen-keepers were without the international connections or power that the liquor 
producers enjoyed, they were a local ancl national force to be reckoned with. 
While this organizational muscle-power of the retailers was undoubtedly 
impressive, it should not be forgotten that the liquor trade operated within a wider 
context as well and that this produced its own constraints. A colonial ruling class 
which had established a state by conquest, and which held out hopes for an 
industrializing economy, was never likely to subscribe fully to a laissez faire 
system. In theory, the ri&t and ability of canteen-keepers to sell unlimited 
quantities of spirits to the growing number of black workers was severely 
circumscribed. According to the regulations, the Liquor Licensing Boards strictly 
vetted all new applications for licences, and they issued only those that were 
considered to be in the public interest. The liquor law of 1889 made it clear that 
canteen-keepers could only sell alcohol to Africans on the production of a permit 
signed by a white master, and that the police and the courts would enforce these 
requirements. Other, less onerous constraints, derived from the wrath of employers 
or the hostility of "public opinionll, which objected to an unfettered trade that 
produced large numbers of drunken, noisy, and at times violent, black workers. The 
barriers that these supposed constraints erected, however, were less than formidable 
in the hamher light of practice. 
The attitudes of the Witwatersrand Liquor Licensing Boards to the scores of 
applications which confronted them throughout the 1880s and the early 1890s can 
euphemistically be described as being "open" or llflexiblell. In the first decade of 
mining development virtually any applicant who could raise the necessary fee was 
granted a retail liquor licence. Strongpetit bourmois representation on the early 
Licensing Boards ensured that there was a considerable Cegree of overlap between what 
was perceived as "business" and llpublic" interest. In July 1889, the Boards were 
taken to task by the local press for not balancing the number of retail outlets in 
Johannesburg against the I1public interestt1: 
"In one corner of this town, within two minutes of the 
Exchange, there are no less than from 10 to 12 licensed 
drinking shops. If the whole town is looked over it 
will be found that purely drinking dens are out of a11 
proportion to the requirements of the people, and 
outside the town the conveniences for Kafirs in 
procuring drink are legion." (78) 
Occasionally, it is true, objections were made to the granting of canteen licences. 
Although framed on the grounds of llhealth" or "social nuisance", the objections of 
complainants usually concealed the more real fear, which was a dread of declining 
property values in the vicinity of canteens. But even in such cases, if the 
applicant could get the support of a local notable such as M r  Jeppe, Sr, then there 
was a good chance of the objection being overruled by the Board. (79) Before 1896, 
one canteen-keeper could thus look towards a basically sympathetic Licensing Board, 
and up to that time the granting of retail licences on the Rand, at very least , kept 
abreast of the expanding population. The aspirant canteen-keeper of the period, 
however, did not have to rely solely on the power of the petit bouraoisie in a 
growing mining town. He could also exploit the deep-seated ambivalence to be found 
in the attitude of the mining capitalists during this period. 
Mine owners were aware that alcohol helped them secure and control black 
workers, and they were therefore most reluctant to support any attempt to close all 
canteens. In fact, the mining capitalists found that they had to act as a brake on 
"public opinionf1 that tended to demand total prohibition for Africans. At a large 
public meeting held in 1891 to discuss the liquor traffic, the mining capitalists and 
their spokesmen were conspicuously unsuccessful in persuading the audience that total 
prohibition for black workers was "premature". (80) Similarly, a Mining Commissioner 
could state in court in the same year, without fear of contradiction in capitalist 
circles, that "nearly every one is agreed that total prohibition would be disastrous 
to the native labour position". (81)- As late as 1895; the Annual Report of the 
Chamber of Mines made it clear that, while the capitalists wanted stricter control of 
the liquor traffic, they did not favour total prohibition. (82) 
This apparently tolerant attitude of most mining capitalists towards the 
canteens did not stem from the casual thoughts of a laissez faire boardroom 
philosophy. Far from it - the mine owners took their cue from the hard school of 
practical experience in the lower echelons of the industry. (83) In particular, 
they were guided by their mine managers, the men who had the most immediate 
experience of the problem of obtaining and controlling African labour. It was the 
mine managers who were most aware that alcohol could "attractf1 labour to the miserable 
compounds and that it assisted in the proletarianization of the migrant labourer - 
all without direct cash cost to the company. In fact, a significant number of mine 
managers actually operated an industrial variant of the Cape "dop system" on the 
Transvaal mines in the early 1890s. When the use of alcohol in the control of black 
workers was debated in the Standard and Diggers' News in 1891, it was noted that: 
l!... familiarity with the glass has built moderation 
in the black man, while it is admitted that better 
work is got out of him when he sees the prospect of 
a cheering glass at the end of the day's labour. 
That is very generally admitted on these Fields also, 
where the permit system is largely taken advantage of 
by employers of coloured labour. At not a few works 
permits are regularly issued for supplies to the 
native hands, the reasonableness of the request for 
stimulating refreshment being amiably admitted on the 
grounds that the 'boy" so humoured and so refreshed 
is the better labo~rer.'~ (84) 
Chamber of Mines ideology and policy up to 1895 was firmly rooted in practice. 
The mine managers' attitudes towards the canteens might have crystallized 
around the issue of labour control, but several of them also had a more personal 
interest in the success of the retail liquor trade. In 1889 it was reported that one 
could "see the names of managers of gold companies attached to the applications for 
canteen licences near the claims, and. in recommendation thereof". (85) While the 
number of canteens close to the compounds was relatively small and the competition 
limited, the mine managers could expect fairly good returns from their shares in the 
liquor business. As the number of canteens grew, however, so competition increased, 
and the managers had to act more vigorously to ensure that "theirf1 canteen still got 
its share of the trade. By 1895 some of their methods, and those of their compound 
managers, aroused the resen-tment of the WLVA. A deputation from the WLPA to the 
Chamber of Mines complained that "on some mines natives are ordered to go to a 
particular canteen in which some employee of the company has a pecuniary 
interest . . .". (86) lkom this and other observations, it is clear that it cannot 
simply be assumed that there was invariably, and inevitably, conflict between the 
mine-manager and the local canteen-keeper. 
If the attitude of the Licensiwg Boards and the actions of many in the 
mining industry gave the liquor retailer space within which to manoeuvre, then 
valuable additional elbow room was prcvided by the state. As long as Hatherley 
Distillery "provided a ready market for large quantities of the burghers' grain", 
many of the Afrikaner ruling class, and Kruger in particular, were hardly hostile to 
the canteen-keepers. (87) As the canteen-keepers saw it, Pretoria was sympathetic or, 
at worst, indifferent. The WLVA was no more reluctant than any other body to join 
the endless stream of petitioners to the Volksraad. In 1889, they were even confident 
enough to petition the government for changes in the "trapping" procedure used by the 
police. (88) 
In the early 1890s it was not simply a question of the state being unwilling 
to act against the liquor retailers - often it was unable to do so. Johannesburg had 
a population of about 25,000 people in June 1889. The entire population of this 
magisterial district, spread over a considerable area, was served by a police force 
of thirty-five men - of which only half were on duty at any one time. (89) Besides 
the small number of policemen, there were also problems with the liquor law. A 
decision handed down by the High Court made it extremely difficult to obtain a 
conviction against any canteen owner who sold liquor to black workers without permits. 
By 1891 the Court had held that only licensees could be prosecuted for this offence 
and, since most canteen-keepers had employees who undertook the actual serving of 
alcohol, convictions were relatively few and far between. (90) In the lower courts, 
at least one magistrate took the opportunity, while passing sentence, of severely 
criticizing the law which made it so difficult for the police to set up successful 
"traps". (91) 
The canteen-keepers were not slow to exploit any of these weaknesses, or 
to open up others. They approached the badly paid policemen of the Zuid Afrikaansche 
Republiek - the Zarps - and succeeded in bribing a significant number of them. (92) 
The business insurance provided by bribery was supplemented by other practical safety 
precautions. Most canteen-keepers employed "a gang of spies to watch the approach of 
the police from every possible corner and frustrate their movements". (93) These 
llspies" and "sentries" were the early rudiments of a petit bourgeois business m 
that was to assume a more organized fom, and adopt a more aggressive posture, during 
the class war of 1897-1899. 
Because of the weakness of the state, the ambivalence of the mining 
capitalists, the studied indifference of the Afrikaner ruling class, and the sympathy 
of the petit bourgeois dominated Licensing Boards, the retail liquor trade boomed 
before 1896. The boom, however, was not without its costs. It killed hundreds of 
workers - black and white - who consumed the working class poison that passed 
commercially as liquor. (94) The Superintendent of the Johannesburg Cemetery was more 
than familiar with notices of intement that listed the cause of death as being 
"alcoholic poisoningt1. He was reported to have surveyed one such corpse and saidr 
"Several of these every week - the cursed stuff burns their insides, and they never 
recover after a drinking bout." (95) This liquor also contributed to the many murders 
in the mining town, as well as the large scale "faction fights" that broke out amongst 
black workers of different ethnic origin. (96) It was also responsible for the 
enormous social problem of drunkenness, or, as the idiom of the day had it, it created 
"hordes of drunken Kaffirs". (97) 
All of these costs, the human costs of the liquor industry, left the 
alliance of class interests in the ZAR relatively unmoved. There was, however, 
another cost which moved them more - the cost to capital. Thus, while no business or 
industrial leaders were willing to complain or protest at the number of working class 
deaths caused by alcohol, they were more than ready to abhor the cost that capital 
had to pay in terms of efficiency and. lowered productivity. In the short term, the 
deaths of the workers did not matter to the capitalists: the dead miner of today was 
bound to be replaced by the German, Cornishman, Zulu or Shangaan of tomorrow. mat 
did matter was that those who were alive should form the core of a productive and 
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efficient labour force. Given the level of alcohol consumption, however, not even 
that could be achieved, and this unnecessarily increased the capitalists' wage bills. 
In 1895, the Chamber of Mines complained that: 
l ' . . .  drunkenness was on the increase at the mines, 
and that, in consequence, the scarcity of labour 
was intensified, as companies able to get them had 
to keep far more boys in their compounds than were 
required on any one day to make up for the number 
periodically disabled by drink. I' (98) 
The percentage of the black labour force "disabled by drink" each day was officially 
estbated by the mine owners to be of the order of l%, but others put it as hi& as 
25%. (99) Either wa;y, it obviously added significantly to the item that was already 
the single lmgest mining cost on the Rand - African wages. 
By 1895-96 it was becoming clear to mine owners that a massive 
contradiction had found its way into the capitalist development of the Transvaal: 
namely, that a.ny further expansion in the large and very profitable liquor industry 
would be at the expense of the very motor of capitalist development - the gold mines. 
This contradiction was not without irony, since individual mining capitalists 
themselves had helped create the Batherley liquor machine which now jeopardized their 
long term profits. Two authors of the time put their finger on the irony and the 
contradiction when, in a neat and incisive passage, they noted of the Pretoria 
Distillery: 
"This is the temple [Hatherley] where are distilled 
those nectars which goad the Kaffirs of the reef 
to deeds of derring-do, and it would certainly have 
paid the present concessionaires, who have large 
mining interests, far better never to have started 
it could they have secured instead a concession for 
1 total prohibitionc . " (100) 
But, altho* the contradiction itself might have become most visible in 1895, there 
is no doubt that mining capital, as opposed to individual mining capitalists, had 
for some time taken cognizance of its long term profitability requirements. It was 
this second strand in the thinking of the mine owners, the recognition of the longer 
term need for a sober and efficient working class, that underpinned t e  "ambivalence" 
of mining capital noted earlier. Thus, from an early date the Chamber of Mines, 
while not in favour of "total prohibitionft, undertook a series of actions which 
attempted to ensure that the liquor consumption of their black workers was controlled. 
At the very time that Hatherley, individual mining capitalists, mine-managers and 
the canteen-keepers were allowing a contradiction to develop whereby the black man 
on the Rand was primarily a liquor consumer, capital, as embodied in the Chamber of 
Mines, was establishing those footholds from which it could ultimately destroy the 
developing contradiction, and ensure that the African was primarily a worker. It is 
to this latter set of actions that we now turn. 
In order to secure the cheap and sober black work-force which alone could 
guarantee profits, the Chamber of Mines could, before 1896, choose to fight on any 
one of three fronts. First, it could go for a head-on confrontation with the 
producers of alcohol - particularly Hatherley, which was the major supplier. 
Secondly, it could put pressure on the state to administer the liquor laws more 
efficiently. Thirdly, it could conduct a campaign against the petit boureoisie 
which, to an increasing extent, was expanding its control of the canteen business. 
Of these three fronts, the first was by far the most difficult to fight on. The 
Afrikaner ruling class, and Kruger in particular, would be most unsympathetic to an 
attack on the liquor concession at Pretoria. Not only was Hatherley perhaps the most 
successful example of m r l s  strategy for industrialization, it also provided a 
large commercial outlet for his burghers' grain. To further complicate matters, 
Kruger personally did business with the distillery and was a close friend of S- 
Marks. In addition, the Chamber would be faced with the embarrassing fact that 
several prominent mining capitalists had financial interests in the distillery. 
Given these realities, it is less than surprising to find that the Chamber 
concentrated its fight on the second and third fronts. 
The Chamber of Mines sought to undermine the canteen-keepers' position at 
the very source of petit bourgeois power - the Liquor Licensing Boards. Using 
"public opinion" that showed gmwing concern about the "hordes of drunken kaffirs", 
the Chamber attempted to apply the brake to the process of granting retail licences. 
By April 1890 the state was already on the defensive, and the government agreed that, 
in future, all licences granted by the Boards would have to be ratified in 
Pretoria. (101) The great public meeting in 1891 to discuss the liquor traffic saw 
further manoeuvring by mining capitalists. The mine owners and their spokesmen got 
public support for a motion which demanded that no new liquor licences be panted 
in mining areas, and that existing licences should not be renewed. They then 
arranged for this, and other resolutions on the liquor question, to be taken to 
Pretoria by a deputation led by George Goch. (102) 
Through exercising continual pressure for what it chose to term lllocal 
representation", the Chamber also succeeded in getting its President appointed to 
the Johannesburg Liquor Licensing Board in 1895. (103) Delighted with its success in 
Johannesburg, where it described the new system as llworking wellf1, the Chamber tried 
to expand its power base to include Krugersdorp and Boksburg. (104) The politicians 
of Pretoria, however, were wary of the expanding power of the mining capitalists, and 
the government resisted further Chamber of Mines pressure in this direction. By the 
mid-1890~~ the Liquor Licensing Boards were becoming politicised, and they were 
simply one of the many forums in which mining capital was pitted against the 
Afrikaner ruling class. This emerged with even greater clarity in the wake of the 
Jameson Raid. In 1896, the government refused to allow the incoming President of the 
Chamber of Mines, J. Hay, to replace Lionel Phillips on the Johannesburg Liquor 
Licensing Board. Instead, the government allocated the seat to H. F. Pistorius, 
President of the Chamber of Commerce, and by so favouring the petit bourmoisie 
underlined its continued suspicion of mining capital. In general, then, battle 
honours on this front were shares, since the government tended to play the petit 
bourgeoisie off against the advances of mining capital. 
On the second front - the attempt to get meater efficiency and action by 
the state against illicit liquor sales - the Chamber of Mines enjoyed slightly greater 
success. Here, away from the politics of committees and on the open ground of llpublic 
opinion", the Chamber could harness more support. In particular, it made use of the 
ground swell of white annoyance at the amount of public violence and drunkenness 
amongst black workers. Chamber of Mines activists frequently raised these issues in 
the columns of the local press, and they were also active at public meetings. At the 
1891 meeting they got support for motions which demanded that the government change 
the rules of evidence as they affected liquor cases, and that offenders be given 
prison sentences in addition to fines. (106) 
This type of Johannesburg residents-cm-Chamber of Mines l1public opinion" 
was not the stuff from which to carve spectacular victories. What was "public opinion" 
to the Chamber of Mines was not necessarily "public opinion" to the Volksraad. 
Nevertheless, the ideological offensive of the Chamber should not be underrated. 
Locally, the effect of llpublic opinionf1 could be seen - and nowhere more clearly than 
in the Court of Magistrate van den Berg. (107) Between September 1889 and June 1891, 
the average fine for selling liquor to a llnativefl without a permit increased by five 
times from £10 or 1 month, to £50 or 3 months. (108) Perhaps more important still 
was the long tern effect of the Chamber's campaign. Their early offensive laid the 
foundations from which a strong attack could be launched on the canteen-keepers in 
1897-99. Before 1895, however, the Chamber of Mines could n ~ t  lay claim to a general 
success on this front, and the clearest indication of this was the continuing liquor 
boom. 
From at least 1891 the Chamber of Mines also worried at the state on 
another front. It attempted to get the government to establish an efficient and 
corruption-free polise force which could deal with the large amounts of gold amalgam 
that white workers stole, and the large amount of liquor that black workers consumed. 
O n  this issue, the tactic of the Chamber of Mines was to exploit the strains of 
disunity within the Afrikaner ruling class. In particular, the mine-owners attempted 
to make use of the growing Afrikaner "progres~ive~~ opposition to President Buger. 
In 1894 Kruger devised a scheme which he hoped would help him upstage his 
Afrikaner political rivals. Hoping to take some of the wind out of the llprogressive" 
sails, he appointed a leading progressive, Ewald Esselen, as State Attorney. (109) 
The gamble which Emger had taken in appointing this Scottish trained lawyer, who was 
broadly opposed to his policies, was quickly spotted by the Chamber of Mines. The 
Chamber noted, with some approval, Esselenls first act on taking office - the separation 
of the hitherto single post of State Attorney and Head of Police. The mine-owners had 
long suspected that previous police commandants were personally involved in the 
illicit liquor traffic, and Esselenl S action gave them more room to manoeuvre. (110) 
With the state departments now more separated, the Chamber of Mines felt freer to 
approach the State Attorney about the problem of of the police. The mine-owners 
suggested to Esselen that a special force of detectives be established to deal 
exclusively with the problems of gold theft and illicit liquor sales. To overcome 
the old syndrome of low salaries and police corruption, it was proposed that the 
"specials" be jointly paid for by the state and the Chamber of Mines. (111) Esselen 
agreed to these proposals and, in order to implement the scheme, he recruited Andrew 
Trimble, from the Cape Colonial service, as Head Detective. 
At this stage the Chamber of Mines had every reason to be optimistic about 
developments on this front. They had, however, chosen to make an advance into one of 
the most sensitive areas - intra~ruling class politics. No sooner had Trimble set 
about his business than opposing groups started agitating for his removal. The 
canteen-keepers, fearful for their trade in what seemed like a new regime, lobbied 
against confirmation of his appointment. (112) More importantly, Khger and his 
supporters were rapidly becoming disenchanged with the policy of toenaderiq towards 
the "progressives". When Trimblecs appointment came up for ratification before the 
Volksraad and Esselen chose to make it an issue of confidence, Ikger saw his 
opportunity for getting rid of both men. The appointment was not confirmed, Esselen 
resigned, and kuger appointed one of "his" Hollanders, Dr Coster, as State Attorney. 
Costercs first action was to reappoint Commandant Schutte as the head of the police 
force - the very man that Esselen had sacked. (113) The Chamber's first attempt to 
exploit cleavages within the Afrikaner ruling class was not successful. 
By late 1895 the Chamber of Mines was faced with this bitter disappointment, 
as well as the fact that it had, at best, achieved only limited success on its other 
fronts of operation. The retail liquor trade boomed and 1895 saw an all time high in 
Transvaal alcohol consumption - the contradiction within capitalist development was 
at its most acute. Confronted with what it could only consider as a series of 
unsavoury realities, the Chamber realized that the time was ripe for a more radical 
approach to the liquor problem. On the 6th July, 1896, the Chamber of Mines called 
a special meeting to consider the "liquor questionu, and from it emerged a new stance. 
The mine-owners jettisoned their old demands for stricter and more efficient control 
of a system which allowed black workers access to alcohol through employercissued 
permits. The capitalists were now willing to abandon any benefits which they might 
have reaped from the operation of their own industrial s-tyle "dop system". Instead, 
the meeting directed the Volksraad's attention totfthe immediate necessity for 
legislation by which the sale of intoxicating liquors to natives in the mining 
districts and surrounding fields shall be totally prohibited". (114) Ln calling for 
"total prohibition", the Chamber of Mines had: finally reached the point at which 
Johannesburg "public opinion" had arrived at least five years earlier. Slowly, 
reluctantly, and only after numerous other courses had been tried, was the Chamber of 
Mines willing to abandon a position which allowed it to exploit alcohol as a means of 
social and economic control over black workers. 
Having achieved ideological fusion with "public opinion" in pursuit of 
"total prohibition", the Chamber of Mines was in a stronger position to challenge the 
Kkxger @vernment. It again sought out and struck the discordant note within the 
Afrikaner ruling class - the "progressivesg~. This time it used the local Volksraad 
member, Geldenhuys, to lobby for a "total prohibition" law. Geldenhuys in turn joined 
forces with at least two other well known "progressives" - H. P. Steenkmp and 
J. G. Kotze. (115) These three, together with other Raad members, ensured that when 
Act 17 of 1896 was passed it contained a "total prohibition" clause. This time, for 
a variety of reasons, the divisions within Afrikaner politics had been capable of 
rapid exploitation and had yielded a handsome dividend. Hereafter, the Chanber of 
Mines clung tenaciously to the "total prohibitionv1 clause under all circumstances. 
In general, the Chamber of Mines could look back on the years before 1896 
as something of a failure, since their black workers had primarily been treated as 
consumers for the benefit of the liquor industry and its allies. Equally, however, 
the Chamber could look forward to the 1st January 1897, when the "total prohibition" 
clause would become effective. As the last weeks of 1896 slipped by, the mine-owners 
had reason to believe that they were on the verge of a golden age in which they would 
have sober, efficient and cheap labour. 
Stalemate: the Black Worker as Worker and Consumer; the Peruvian Connection and 
the Rise of the Illicit Liquor Syndicates, 1897-99 
In order to appreciate fully and understand the problems of liquor 
producers in this second period, the years between 1897 and 1899, it is necessary to 
restate asld summarize what had occurred in the months immediately before. 
As viewed from Samqy Marks's position in the Hatherley boardroom, 1896, and 
especially 1897, were not good years for business. Ever since the opening of the 
Louren~o Marques railway line in 1895, increasing quantities of Delagoa Bay rum and 
Germa;n potato spirits had found their way to the Witwatersrand. The Pretoria 
Distillery's grain spirit simply could not hold its share of the market against the 
cheaper imported liquor. In 1896, for the first time in its history, Hatherley found 
itself with falling sales, and between 1895 and 1896 net profits fell from £98,274 
to £69,569. What made matters worse was the fact that the principal producers and 
wholesalers in Mozambique had become increasingly well organized. In order to 
protect their own profit margins, the firms in Portuguese East Africa had got 
together to form an "Alcohol Trust" in 1896. Members of the Trust agreed "to sell 
only an equal number of gallons each, in proportion to the demand", and, more 
importantly, "to a uniform price". (116) In effect, two giant competitors were 
challenging each other for the Transvaal market - a situation far away from the cosy 
concession that Marks and his partners had bought nearly a decade earlier. Then, as 
if this picture of business-woe were somehow insufficient, came the growing talk of 
"total prohibitiont1. No sooner had the rumours of "total prohibition" been circulated 
than the 1896 liquor act had been passed. When "total prohibition" came into force 
on the 1st January 1897, Hatherley Distillery was required to make the traumatic 
transition from being a squeezed competitor to being a producer almost without a 
market at all. Overwhelmingly dependent on its liquor sales to black workers, 
Hatherley was totally unprepared for such a dramatic setback. The lowered profit 
margin of 1896 looked handsome beside the net loss of £46,988 sustained in 1897. 
In attempting to overcome this increasingly depressing situation, Marks and 
his directors could have adopted any one of three basic strategies. First, they 
could have fought a defensive battle in order to regain what had been theirs in the 
past - monopoly production for a black retail market unhampered by cheaper imports. 
In practice, this would have involved getting "total prohibition" lifted, and at the 
same time stopping the Delagoa Bay trade in spirits. As a supplement to this 
strategy, the Distillery would continue, to the best of its ability, to supply the 
illicit liquor dealers who managed to operate despite the nominal "total prohibition". 
Secondly, by adopting innovative and creative marketing stragegies, they could try to 
redefine what exactly they considered to be lltheirffmarket. Here the most logical move 
would be to try to switch to the European retail liquor trade and hope that this would 
compensate for the "lost" African market. Thirdly, and most aggressively, Hatherley 
itself could attempt to get into the rum and potato spirits business - a move that 
would protect the Distillery from price under-cutting, should the African market be 
resuscitated to its full former strength. In practice, this would mean going lhulti- 
national", and somehow reaching agreement with the powerful "Alcohol Trust" in 
Mozambique. Given the magnitude of the problems facing Hatherley, the directors 
could not afford to dismiss any of these possibilities. Making frill use of the 
business brains on his board, as well as their wide range of contacts, Marks chose to 
work on all of these possibilities. 
Four months before "total prohibitionf1 was due to be enforced, the managing 
director opened his campaign to defend the Pretoria Distillery. He wrote to the 
government on the 7th August 1896, protesting about the new liquor law and pointing 
out that it severely damaged the concession which he and his partners had been 
granted. (117) Six weeks after "total prohibition" came into effect, on the 19th 
February 1897, Marks again wrote to the government in similar vein. (118) Neither of 
these initiatives brought any response from an unsympathetic administration, and Marks 
realized that he would have to approach them yet again. On the 30th April 1897, he 
wrote the strongest letter yet, containing a final plea, and making new proposals. 
The managing director on this occasion first chose to remind the Volksraad of the 
capital invested in the Distillery, and of the fact that the glass factory had been 
erected almost solely at their insistence. Marks followed up this rather stinging 
reminder with yet another telling point. He pointed out to the Raad that the 
poisonous duty-free spirit that came into the Transvaal made a mockery of their 
concession to him, and that it hardly qualified as the "produce of Portugal1'. Having 
established his case, Masks then proceeded to put forward his proposals. He suggested 
that the state should undertake more rigorous quality-control measures against the 
liquor sold on the Rand - a blow aimed at cheap potato spirits. Marks followed this 
up with a request to be allowed to import duty-free certain blending materials and 
essences that he required for his business. (119) Finally, he asked that the 
Distillery be compensated for the losses that it had been forced to sustain as a 
result of government measures. (120) Virtually all of this April appeal was also 
ignored by the state. 
The absence of a positive government response might have disappointed Marks, 
but it could hardly have surprised him. After all, it was only a matter of months 
since the Volksraad had voted for the "progressiveI1 measures contained in the liquor 
bill. Marks, as well as any man in the Transvaal, knew that Emger was personally 
sympathetic to the canteen-keepers and Hatherley, but that he could not muster 
sufficient support to reverse the clauses contained in the liquor act. If Marks was 
to get the Volksraad to act, then he had somehow to increase the political leverage 
of the State President and his supporters. In order to do this, Marks and his 
Hatherley men set to work on "public opinion". The Distillery books subsequently 
showed that, during 1897, sums from £20 to £40 were paid to unnamed persons who would 
organize petitions calling for an end to "total prohibition". (121) In order to avoid 
raising the suspicions of the most hostile Volksraad members, the petitions were 
worded so as to make no specific reference to IfHatherley Distillery". (122) Although 
the fate of these petitions is unknown, it seems probable that they entered the 
political currency of the time,& that they played their small part in the liquor 
commissions of 1898 and 1899. 
At the same time as he was writing to the government and organizing a 
petition programme, Marks was also making important changes within the Distillery 
itself. In particular, he ensured that there was a shift in production emphasis, 
away from cheap spirits to the manufacture of quality liquor more suitable for 
European customers. (123) This move neatly supplemented his request to the 
government for tighter quality control of spirits sold on the Witwatersrand, and he 
underlined his seriousness in this respect by arranging for the recruitment of top 
class distillers in Europe. By early 1897 these new distillers - R. van Eibergen 
Santhagens from the Netherlands, Le Farge from France, and H. Coffey from Scotland - 
were at work at Hatherley. (124) 
Neither of the two broad courses outlined above, however, were in themselves 
sufficient to place Hatherley on a sound economic foundation. Individually, these 
strategies were inconclusive, and collectively they had the disadvantage of being 
time consuming. By mid-1897, it was abundantly clear to Marks and his colleagues 
that their long term security lay in making a quick and definitive entry into the 
Delagoa B= trade, which was continuing to be the major supplier of the now illicit 
liquor trade in the Transvaal. 
Marks's first move was to contact the two Lourenpo Marques wholesalers at 
the very centre of the "Alcohol Trust" - Hutt & Auerbach, and Joost & Gubler. (125) 
It is probable that the former acted as the wholesale outlet for the Soci6t6 
Franpaise de Distillerie, since the latter certainly acted in that capacity for the 
Mopea Distillery of the Companhia do Assucar. Through these firms and another 
intermediary, Baron dfInhaca, Marks tried to establish exactly how much capital 
Hatherley would require to get control of the largest liquor producer in Mozambique. 
By early December 1897, the board of Hatherley Distillery knew that they required at 
least £50,000 if they were to get a controlling interest in the French company's 
distilleries at Lourenpo Marques and Ressano Garcia. (126) 
The Hatherley directors knew that they had to raise this money if they were 
not going to be continually vulnerable on their Mozambique flank. Knowing how much 
to raise, however, was not the same as knowing how to raise it, and it was to this 
problem that the directors now addressed themselves. h looking for a solution to 
this problem, Marks and his colleagues would have known that the Paris Bourse was 
likely to be interested in the prospect of a large company, especially one with a 
good record like Hatherley, taking over the French company. If they did not know it 
themselves, then Hemi Duval of the Banque de llAfrique du Sud in Johannesburg would 
certainly have told them. The directors therefore decided to raise capital through a 
new share issue. It seems likely that maay of the 75,000 £1 shares made available to 
the public were placed in Paris. At the same time the Pretoria company decided to 
establish a permanent "Paris Committeef1 of four members - a structure that already 
had precedent in the form of a similar "London Conunittee". (127) By the end of 1897, 
Sammy Marks was the chairman of a company with listings in Paris and London, and with 
an issued share capital of close on half a million pounds. (128) 
From this stronger base, negotiations for the acquisition of the French 
company could continue. On the 12th January 1898, the chairman of the French company, 
Villar, and the secretary of his Ressano Garcia Distillery, Paul Regnet, were both 
present at a meeting of the Hatherley board. By this time, the French company's 
asking price had risen by £10,000 and the deal was finally concluded at £60,000. (129) 
By the 31st January 1898, Hatherley Distillery was in fonnal control of the Harmonia 
Distillery in Louren~o Marques, and the newer distillery at Ressano Garcia. (130) 
Ever since 1895, Hatherley had been forced to drop its prices in an attempt 
to compete with the cheaper imported spirits. (131) Having bought control in the 
largest c o m p w  in Mozambique, Marks now had access to the "Alcohol Trust" and he 
could set to work on the price problem with interests of the parent company in mind. 
By March 1898, the "Alcohol Trust" had reached a new price and marketing arrangement 
that met with Hatherley approval. The new terms effectively limited the competitive 
power of all the Lourens0 Marques distilleries bar one, and that of the Mopea 
Distillery to the far north. With virtually all the distilleries that catered for 
the Witwatersrand market in line, the "Alcohol Trust" was ready for a move into 
Johannesburg. By mid-1898, the "Trmst" had established a large depot in Kruis Street, 
where its wholesale activities were managed by J. F. De Villiers. (132) 
All this success in Mozambique still did not satisfy the Ratherley board, 
who had been stmg out of any possible complacency by their loss of £46,000 in 1897. 
In particular, they remained worried by the threat posed by one of the smaller 
factories in Lourengo Marques - Dyballcs Distillery. It was for this remaining 
competitor that had not become a member of the "Trustt1 that Sa,mmy Ma.rks developed a 
special costless strategy. Marks instructed the firm of Hutt & Auerbach to take out 
an option to buy Dyballgs on behalf of Hatherley Distillery. In practice, however, 
Marks and his colleagues did not have the slightest intention of buying the distillery. 
Instead, they merely made w e  of the option to suspend spirit production at Dyballls, 
and to prolong the '!negotiationsn for as long as possible. This strategy, and its 
objectives, were made cleas to Hutt & Auerbach in a letter from the secretary at 
Hatherley, J. P. H. Faure, on the 2nd April 1898. (133) Altho* it cannot be 
conclusively proved, it seems possible that Masks's scheme eventually worked. Dyballls, 
on the strength of the option, certainly suspended spirit production until at least 
June 1898, a sacrifice of at least 3 months' output. (134) By 1899, there was no 
evidence of a "Dyballl S Distilleryw being in active production in Lourengo Marques. (135) 
Capital, business acumen and ruthless determination all contributed to the 
relative ease with which the Pretoria financial generals had captured Mozambique. 
Their task, however, had also been made easier by the comparative indifference of the 
Portuguese capitalists - a surprising development, given the latter's interest in 
spirit production during the early 1890s. 
The recent indifference of the Portuguese capitalists dated back to 1896. 
During that yeas not only had the !'total prohibition" clause been passed in the 
Transvaal, but the Cape farmers had experienced a particularly bad wine harvest. 
Prominent Portuguese capitalists, and the Lisbon administration, decided that this 
was an opportune moment to break into the wine market of southern and central Africa. 
A senior civil servant was sent to tour throughout the region and report on the 
business prospects. In the wake of his report a large wine depot was opened in 
Louren~o Marques, and a wholesale business under F. S. Belford was established in 
Pretoria. Belford not only sold wine reasonably successfully from this base; he 
also tried to get a "wine con~ession~~ from the Transvaal government. (136) To put it 
at its crudest: Pretoria's capital had succeeded in getting into Mozambique because 
Portuguese capital was intent on establishing itself in Pretoria. On the one hand, 
new industrial capital wished to monopolise spirit production for the African market, 
while, on the other, older mercantile capital hoped to dominate the Eumpean wine 
market offered by settler societies. Whatever the cause of these developments, they 
suited Batherley in the short run and, in 1898, the Pretoria Distillery made a profit. 
Within twelve months Sammy Marks had steered his enterprise from a £46,000 loss to a 
£10,000 profit. 
The battle waged for the ownership of the means of production in Mozambique 
between 1897 and 1898 revealed several things. For one, it showed the capacity of 
South African based capital to move into profitable sectors of economies in adjacent 
countries before the South African War. More fundamentally, it demonstrated that 
larger capital had to consume smaller capital when the former was faced with a 
declining rate of profit. Most importantly for present purposes, however, it showed 
that the capitalists knew that they still had access to a market for their product - 
Why else fight for spirit production in a period of so-called "total prohibition"? 
The fact that the market continued to be accessible after 1897 was not primarily due 
to the efforts of the capitalists themselves. For that vital pre-requisite, the 
owners of the distilleries, the capitalists, had to thank another class - the petit 
bourgeoisie who owned the canteens. 
When "total prohibition" came into effect on the 1st January 1897, at least 
half of the canteens in the mining areas of the Transvaal closed down. (137) The new 
law and the stiffer penalties which it provided for simply frightened the more timid 
half of this sector of the petit bourmoisie out of business. Many of the other 
canteen-keepers, however, took heart - What other Rand businessmen could point to a 
market in which competition had been reduced by 5% at a stroke? Moreover, canteen 
closures had the effect of reducing supply while demand, at very least, remained 
constant. In practice this pushed up prices, and profit margins, in the retail 
liquor trade. In 1898, a bottle of Delagoa B a ~ r  spirits cost 6d to produce, the 
Transvaal importer sold it for 2s 6d per bottle, and the illicit liquor dealer sold 
it to the African consumers at 5s or 6s per bottle. (138) Higher profit margins, in 
part a by-product of prohibition itself, ensured that the illicit liquor market on 
the Witwatersrand persisted. 
Some of these liquor sales took place from "kaffir eating houses" and . 
stores in the vicinity of the mines. Frequently the quantities sold here were 
relatively small, and the trade was organized on a somewhat spasmodic basis. In many 
cases, an essentially law-abiding storekeeper bolstered his sales through occasional 
trading in a commodity that yielded a handsome profit. In yet other cases, canteen- 
keepers would cater essentially for the European trade and occasionally sell the odd 
bottle of spirits to Africans at the back door. These types of outlets, however, were 
largely insignificant and they simply constituted the tip of the illicit iceberg. 
More substantial by far were the large, well organized syndicates that moved into a 
trade which yielded profits of between 100% and 1500h. It was these synbicates, 
dominated by east European Jews, that constituted the very core of the illicit liquor 
trade. As early as March 1897, these German, Polish, and Russian Jews ran an illicit 
trade which the Chamber of Mines described as "rampant". (139) With the passage of 
time they became even more entrenched, and it was they who formed the nucleus of a 
petit bourneois m that defied the state and the mine-owners between 1897 and 1899. 
It was no accident that east European immigrants came to occupy a dominant 
position in the liquor trade of the Transvaal in the 1890s. Many of them were drawn 
from countries in which spirit production occupied a central role in the economy. 
Indeed, throwout the 18th and the early 19th centuries, alcohol manufacturing had 
played a crucial part in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe. In 
Rumania in the 18th century, for example, the Porte had prohibited the export of corn 
from any of the provinces. Faced with grain surpluses, the Rumanian landlords took 
to distilling spirits with which they then paid their labourers. The remainder of 
the spirits they obliged villagers to buy at the public houses which they opened on 
their estates. (140) In Russia, liquor leases were widely sold between 1712 and 1863. 
These leases proved to be "a significant means of primary accumulation of capitalf1, 
and "were the origin of the later fortunes of the large industrial bourgeois families 
of the Yakolevs , Zlobins , Saposhnikovs , and Kokorevstl. (141) The Russian nobility 
were also not above the liquor trade, and the princes Dolgoruki, Gagazin, Kurakin 
and Potemkin all earned a sizable part of their income from this source. At very 
least, east European immigrants to the Transvaal would have been vaguely aware of the 
fact that alcohol had a part to play in the emergence of capitalist systems. 
The 19th century Jewish immigrants to South Africa, however, had no real 
need for the hazy models of economic history. Many of them had personal experience 
of the liquor trade, not as members of "large industrial bourgeois families", but as 
petit bourwois publicans in Eumpe. In Russia and the Ukraine, for example, most of 
the canteens in the rural areas during the mid-19th century were owned by Jewish 
businessmen. The l1korchmaW, or tavern, figured as a prominent institution in peasant 
life, and many Ukrainian folk songs of the time bemoaned the peasant's indebtedness to 
the local Jew. (142) This, amongst many other reasons, made Jewish tavern-keepers 
prominent targets for local hatred and resentment, and they suffered accordingly 
during the disturbances and pogroms of the 19th century. Amongst the many Jewish 
refugees who made their way to the Transvaal, and elsewhere, there must have been 
more than a smattering of korchma-keepers. 
Given this broader context, we can bring at least one new, albeit highly 
speculative, dimension to our understanding of events in the Transvaal. Now it is 
perhaps easier to see why the Hungarian, Nellmapius, would have been so quick to 
appreciate the value of a liquor concession. Similarly, we can appreciate why three 
Russian Jews - Isaac Lewis, Barnet Lewis and Sammy Marks - were willing to go into 
partnership with Nellmapius when the opportunity arose. These men, amongst the first 
European immigrants, came to a Transvaal that was, if not "feudal", then at least pre- 
capitalist. As entrepreneurs present from the very outset of industrial development 
in the area, they rapidly established themselves as respected members of the emerging 
capitalist class. Nellmapius was one of the most prominent and powerful businessmen 
of his day. Like several of his Russian predecessors, Sammy Marks accumulated a 
considerable amount of his capital from the liquor business, and he certainly came to 
head an llindustrial bourgeois familyf1. 
This small, and occasionally higkly successful,first wave of Jewish 
immigrants to the Transvaal was followed by a second wave of Europeans when gold was 
discovered in the mid-1880s. The men of this latter period saw their opportunities 
in the mushrooming towns of the Witwatersrand. Without the means, or the personal 
access to the Afrikafier ruling class that would enable them to become capitalists, 
these men sought to accumulate their initial capital as apetit bourmoisie. In 
particular, many of them opened canteens, and, as korchma-keepers in the pre- 
prohibition era, they sold spirits to the black peasants who had come to the mines for 
a spell of wage labour. These men, men like Herschfield, the chairman of the 
Witwatersrand Licensed Victuallers! Association, might not have been llrespectedll in
the same way that liquor capitalists like Samy Marks were llrespectedll, but they were 
certainly a force to be reckoned with by the state and the mine-owners. 
The third wave of Jewish immigrants that entered the ZAR in the mid-1890~~ 
however, was less fortunate than their countrymen who had arrived in earlier migrations. 
For these poorest of East Europeans, not even the petit bourgeois path to capital 
accumulation remained open. By 1895 even the Chamber of Mines and the WLVA, for very 
different reasons, had agreed that no more canteen licences should be issued. (143) 
This tightening up was followed within months by the liquor act of 1896 which bro-t 
with it the blow of "total prohibition". Poor, and with every prospect of remaining 
penniless, many of these unfortunate immigrants were pushed into the life of the 
lwn~en proletariat. As perhaps the most visible, dispossessed and unsuccessful group 
of whites on the Witwatersrand, they were the unhappy recipients of the most vicious 
class and race prejudice that society could muster: 
"The stranger in Johannesburg cannot but ponder on 
the spectacle of a Kafir respectably arrayed in good 
Eumpean clothing walking in the middle of the street, 
with a brass ticket strapped on his arm, while on the 
neighbouring footww may be seen, and even smelt, 
some representative of European civilization, perhaps 
a "Peruvianw from Poland or Russia, who has apparently 
not found it convenient to change his clothing or 
indulge in unnecessary ablutions since his entry into 
the country." (144) 
For most of these "very low class of Russian and Polish Jews, tPeru~ianst~~, life in 
Johannesburg might have been totally miserable, but it certainly was not lonely. (145) 
In 1899, it was estimated that there were over 7,000 "Russian Jews" on the 
Witwatersrand. (146) 
After 1897, there developed amongst these different classes of Jewish 
immigrants various more or less explicit marriages of economic convenience which 
ultimately depended on the liquor trade with black workers. The capitalist liquor 
producers, Samrqy Marks and the Lewis brothers, remained in business largely because 
of the activities of the petit bourffeois canteen-keepers. The converse was, of 
course, equally true. In practice, the producers and the retailers never met face to 
face, since both operated through another group, the merchant capitalists who acted 
as wholesalers. These were firms such as the "Continental Wine & Spirit Association", 
managed by Joseph Mendelssohn, brother to the editor of the Standard and Diggers' 
News. (147) The most explicit marriage of economic convenience, however, took place 
-
between the petit boursoisie and the tlPeruviansll of the lumpen proletariat. Members 
of the former group had no wish to jeopardize their liquor licences through being 
caught personally selling alcohol to Africans, whilst members of the latter were so 
poor that any opportunity to earn money came as an offer which they could not refuse. 
The canteen-keepers therefore 
l'... engaged newly arrived young Russian Jews, at what 
might appear to them princely remuneration, agreeing, 
in the event of the latter being trapped and 
prosecuted, to pay the fines, or, if they were sent 
to prison, to pay them a lump stlm on release as 
compensation. l1 (148) 
It was this latter arrangement, the flPeruvian Connection", that came to form the base 
line of a hierarchical pyramid of business exploitation. 
The exact mode of organization and the size of the illicit liquor syndicates 
varied considerably. A small minority of the businesses were entirely dependent on 
the driving force, skill, and organizational ability of one man. H. Max, for example, 
kept on the move continually and never sold liquor from the same spot for more than a 
day or two. (149) In some cases, this type of "mobile canteen" on a waggon had to be 
drawn by as many as ten oxen. (150) Other canteen-keepers, like Tiversky of the "Old 
Grahwtown Bar1', or H. Joffe of the l'Old Kentish Tavern", operated from a single 
business base. (151) At most, such men would employ three or four l1Peruvianf1 
assistants. 
The majority of medium-to-large businesses, however, were syndicates in the 
more real sense that they were a partnership in which two, three, or four Itbig ment1 
were involved. The partnership of Judelsohn, Nathan and Cohen, for example, owned the 
Californian Hotel, the "Station Bar", and the glFerreirats Gate Bar". (152) Similarly, 
the partnership of Friedman, Pastolsky and Katzen owned the "Old Park", "Jumperst1 and 
llWolhuter't bars. (153) Syndicates of this size had several 'lPeruviansll and dozens of 
other employees on their pay-roll. 
The largest of this type of syndicate in the late 1890s was that of 
Finestone, Lediker, Sacke and Schlossberg. By April 1899, they were reported as 
having no less than ten illicit liquor outlets on the Rand, with a collective monthly 
turnover of about £46,000. (154) Out of this, the syndicate had to pay a monthly 
bill for police bribes of E2,000, and this left the partners with a monthly profit 
in the vicinity of £8,000. (155) This syndicate, or the one that was reputed to have 
made £18,000 during three months1 trading in 1898, would probably have employed at 
least a score of llPeruviansll as their front-men. (156) Although its size was 
obviously important, the Finestone syndicate also had other features which made it 
important in the financial life of Johannesburg. Like many other criminal 
organizations in capitalist systems, the syndicate controlled a financial empire 
which spanned both legal and illegal business activities. Finestone was "a prominent 
member of the Stock Exchange", and, together with his other partners, held a share in 
five hotels which were described as "some of the most adequately and expensively 
equipped establishments on the whole line of the Reef". (157) 
The largest and best organized syndicates of all, however, revealed some of 
the classic hallmarks of organized crime. In the finest tradition of the underground, 
the most powerful smdicates were llfa.mily businesses" which dominated particular 
territories. Anybody who wished to open an illicit liquor canteen in the Boksburp 
Benoni district, for example, would have had to come to grips with one such powerful 
family syndicate. But, as was explained in 1899: 
"The rules are somewhat onerous. Firstly, the consent 
of the syndicate has to be obtained, without which the 
new business would not flourish for a week. Then the 
new-comer has to purchase his liquor at a certain 
wholesale store in Johannesburg [probably Friedmanls]. 
Finally, the syndicate takes a large share of the 
profits. So that to start a liquor syndicate is 
sowing seed on the hard and unfertile rock of the 
Syndicate Monopoly. l1 (158) 
Just as the Nathanson family ruled this district of Boksburg~Benoni, so the Joffes 
ruled Krugersdorp and Randfontein, while the mighty Friedmans controlled 
Johannesburg. (159) 
At the head of a family syndicate stood the Liquor "Kingf1, and if, like Sam 
Nathanson, he had sons, then he would be assisted by the llPrincesll. Immediately below 
thisllroyal familyf1, and within the syndicate organization proper, there followed a 
hierarchy of llPeruviansll who constituted the Kings1 llloyal men". It was this business 
army of llPeruviansll who organized most of the day-to-day activities in the drinking 
dens - men such as Sol Pastolsky who was described as IsGeneral Commanding Officert1, 
of the area around the New Heriot mine. (160) Similarly, the "Peru~ian'~ in control 
at the Nourse Deep mine was known as Commandant Schutte, a hmourous title which his 
namesake at the head of the Zarps might have found less amusing. (161) 
Outside this immediate corps of loyal llPeruvianll assistants, the King could 
also rely on the vast number of state officials whom he had bribed. The task of 
these bribed officials was twofold. Firstly, they had to ensure that no state action 
was taken against the Kingls syndicate. Secondly, they had to harass the business 
operations of unwelcome competitors or enemies who had muscled their way into the 
King!$ territory. (162) The degree of control which the King had over the state 
officials within his territory was a matter of considerable pride and prestige, since 
it reflected the real extent of his power. In Johannesburg, King hiedman publicly 
claimed that he was the "real bossf1 of the police "Liquor Department", while King 
Nathanson "repeatedly declared that he was the Landdrost of the detectives of 
Boksburgl1. (163) Apparently Nathansonls boast was not completely idle, since the 
State Attorney had his doubts about what was happening in the district, and the local 
press felt confident enough to report tha&: 
llYou need no concealment in the Boksburg district; the 
place is a patch of the blackest villainy in the 
Republic. There is not one single official connected 
with the supervision, licensing, and control of liquor 
selling, from the highest magistrate to the lowest 
constable, who does not deserve to be cashiered . . .l1 (164) 
The Liquor Kings of the late 1890s used their armies constantly, both to 
expand and defend their empires. Like Sanrm;y Marks, they worked on "public opiniont1, 
paying "Peru~ians~~ and other poor whites to put their signatures to petitions calling 
for an end to "total prohibition1'. Their political activities caused them to move 
constantly between their districts and Pretoria, and, in 1898, State Attorney Smuts 
described them as tlbecoming a power at all elections1'. (165) More important, and 
equally sinister, was the impressive way in which they could wield power when things 
went tlwrongll for the syndicate. Any tlPeruvianll finally trapped by the police and 
brought to court was likely to benefit from the strange developments that frequently 
took place, On at least one occasion a bottle of gin that was used in evidence, as 
if Ifby some miracle . . . turned to water when brought to Court1'. (166) If the material 
exhibits in the case did not chaulge, then the llPeruviantl could always look forward 
to one of the unscheduled disappearances of African witnesses for the prosecution. 
By late 1899, the police had to protect their "trap boys" from pre-trial syndicate 
approaches, by imprisoning them until the case was heard. (167) Of course, not all 
witnesses could, or would, come to agreement with the syndicates. In such cases the 
witnesses stood the risk of less profitable, and more permanent, lldisappearance". 
On. several occasions the syndicates were suspected of organized killings on the 
Witwatersrand. (168) 
There were also, however, limits to syndicate power, and perhaps these 
constraints were most clearly revealed in the way that the drinking dens were 
organized. The King would always make certain that he took out wholesale liquor 
licences only for those stands from which the syndicate could be guaranteed to have 
access to adjacent properties. He would also take the precaution of warning his 
assistants that only legal sales should take place from the licensed property. 
Failure to do this would have placed the licence itself in jeopardy and, in the event 
of a successful prosecution, ultimately have killed the goose that laid the golden 
egg* 
Once the above concession to the law had been made, the King could set about 
organizing the rest of his defensive strategy on the star-l! adjacent to the licensed 
property. First, the "adjacent stand" - be it house or vacant property - would be 
linked to the licensed property by means of an underground tunnel. Thereafter, the 
entranceto these -els would be hidden with the aid of elaborate false partitions 
and trapdoors. Carpenters and electricians would then be called in to arraage for 
the final protection of the unlicensed property. On vacant stands, hi& fences would 
be erected along the perimeter of the property, with strategic lllook-outtt posts at 
each of the corners. From these posts "Peruvian sentries" would keep constant watch 
for the approach of the police. These dens, with an irony that the mine-owners would 
not have appreciated, were often called ttcompoundsll. (169) Many of the llcompoundst' 
and houses were also protected through the installation of a system of electric bells 
on the unlicensed property. This technologically sophisticated system, pioneered by 
one "Fred Poplarf1 Cohen and widely used during prohibition, gave swift warning of the 
approach of any unsympathetic Zarps. (170) In several instances, final precautions 
were made at the actual point of sale itself. l'Peruvianll Silverman, for example, 
seated himself inside a specially constructed wooden compartment into which had been 
cut peep-holes and the smallest of serving hatches. This arrangement enabled him to 
see the customer, receive the cash, and dispense a bottle of spirits while remaining 
hidden. (171) With these elaborate precautions, it is hardly surprising that many of 
the illicit liquor dens were called llfortsll, and that they had to be wrushedll by the 
police. (172) In a very literal sense, it was the army of the petit bourmoisie that 
held the state and mine owners at bay between 1897 and 1899. 
This rapid entrenchment of the liquor syndicates after 1897 had not escaped 
the attention of the state, and the Volksraad realized to its embarrassment that 
lttotal prohibitiontt was lltotal" in name only. Even if the state wanted to turn a 
blind eye to the massive illicit liquor trade, it would not have been allowed to do 
so. S- Marks constantly reminded members of the Raad about their obligations as 
outlined in his concession, while the retailers exercised their own particular brands 
of persuasion and coercion. The mine-owners, for their part, made their bitter 
complaints well known in evidence to the Industrial Commission of Inquiry in 1897.(173) 
By the end of that year, these insistent pressures could no longer be ignored, and the 
administration felt compelled to act. Early in 1898, the State President appointed 
the Acting State Attorney, Schagen van Leeuwen, and the Inspector General of Customs 
to a special liquor commission. The appointment of this commission must have removed 
some of the immediate pressure on the hard pressed administration. (174) 
The Volksraad, however, was not the State President, and members of the Raad 
certainly did not feel or respon4 to exactly the same pressure that Buger felt. The 
appointment of the liquor commission, therefore, offered different opportunities to 
these two branches of the government. As far as the Raad was concerned, the task of 
the commission was clear - it had to find ways of defeating the illicit liquor 
syndicates, and suggest ways of enforcing the liquor act of 1896. For Buger, 
personally sympathetic to the liquor industry, the commission offered an opportunity 
to renew his battle with a Volksraad that basically favoured "total prohibitiont1. If 
the liquor commission produced suitable findings, then the State President would have 
valuable munition in his fight against the llprogressivesll, and a chance to protect 
the fortunes of his llEerste Fabriek". With a two-man commission, one of whom was a 
loyal Hollander, Buger had every reason to be confident about the findings of the 
commission. 
By mid-March 1898, the confidential report of the commission had been 
completed. Basically, its findings represented a compromise between the views of the 
Volksraad and those of the State President. As the report put it, "The commission is 
of the opinion that a moderate use of drink by the natives, under control of or on 
behalf of the Government and the mine managers, must in every way effect an 
improvementl1. (175) In order to achieve this "moderate usef1, the commission proposed 
the adoption of a modified Gothenburg system - a type of state monopoly that seemed to 
work most successfully in Sweden. It suggested that liquor should be sold to l1nativesl1 
in the Transvaal, but that: 
"This should not take place by means of money, but by 
cards, or tickets, which would have been purchased 
by the companies from the Government, and which after 
being stamped with the authority of the mine managers, 
would again be sold to the coloured people; the 
latter could then, as it were, themselves exercise 
control over the use of drink by natives." (176) 
This scheme was to be supplemented with increased quality controls, better law 
enforcement, and a chain of state canteens which would be the sole retail liquor - -  
outlets on the Witwatersrand. The commissioners must have hoped that this degree of 
ll~ontrol~~ would satisfy the mine owners, that the llprogressivesll would be pacified by 
the proposed onsla-t on llabusesll, a3ld that Duger and Marks would feel content 
about the prospects for Hatherley Distillery. On paper at least, the perfect 
compromise had been reached, and the contradiction which so plagued the development 
of capitalism in the Transvaal would be shortly resolved. 
On the 31st March 1898, the Rand mine-owners were startled to read in the 
Johannesburg Times "that the establishment of a State monopoly in liquor was under 
c~nsideration~~. (177) After this press leak, the state felt obliged to let the mine 
owners know the hitherto confidential findings of the liquor commission, and on the 
14th April Dr van Leeuwen detailed the government~s proposals in a letter to the 
Chamber of Mines. (178) 
The mine-owners were most unsatisfied with these proposals. In particular, 
the Chamber of Mines held two strong objections. Firstly, it felt that there was 
insufficient 'Toccal controlll in the scheme - in short, the mine-owners would not have 
eno- power to determine how many canteens there were to be, or where they were to 
be sited. Secondly, and more importantly, it doubted the capacity of the state to 
administer the scheme successfully. The bribery and corruption of the police force 
were already clearly evident. What would happen when the officials of the ZAR were 
put in charge of canteens? In fact, the mine owners were so frightened by the 
prospect of a system developing in which uncontrolled legal sales of alcohol to black 
workers would take place that they were willing to settle for the unsatisfactory 
status quo. On the 20th April 1898, the Chamber thus wrote back to the State 
Attorney reiterating its support for "total prohibition" and calling for the effective 
enforcement of Act 17 of 1896. (179) 
The Chamber of Mines followed this letter with a petition addressed to the 
Volksraad along the same lines. (180) This was a move calculated to exploit the 
divisions within the Afrikaner ruling class on the liquor question. The Chamber's 
uncompromising opposition to the principal recommendations of the liquor commission, 
as well as the mine-owners' direct appeal to a Volksraad so recently committed to 
"total prohibition1!, drastically reduced the State President's room to manoeuvre. 
When the amended liquor law was debated in the Volksraad later in 1898, the lltotal 
prohibitionIt clause was retained by 18 votes to 8. (181) The recommendations of the 
1898 liquor commission were never implemented. 
These events, however, warned the mine-owners, if they needed reminding, 
that the State President and his closest allies were deeply committed to Eerste 
Fabrieken and the liquor trade. The Chamber could therefore expect another move in 
the same direction, in the not too distant future. The mine-owners were also distressed 
by these developments because they did not offer them any immediate relief from the 
activities of the illicit liquor syndicates. Black miners would continue to be good 
alcohol consumers and bad workers. Faced with this dismal prospect, the mining 
capitalists decided on a radical initiative which would, if successful, shape the 
future in their favour. 
Early in May 1898, the Chamber of Mines approached van Leeuwen and asked the 
government whether it had any objection to the mine-owners coming to a direct 
settlement with Eerste Fabrieken. Such a settlement, it was suggested, would meet the 
interests of the mine-owners, the government and the distillery. The State Attorney, 
no doubt with Krugerb full approval, indicated his support for a move that would 
once again try to circumvent the impasse that had developed around the flliquor 
questiont1. The Chamber of Mines at once set about establishing a "Special Liquor 
Committeef1 - the mine-owners' equivalent of the ill-fated government liquor 
commission. 
The Special Liquor Committee (SLC) had every reason to be optimistic about 
their direct approach to the Pretoria Distillery. Members of the SLC knew that many 
of the most powerful capitalists in the liquor industry were also deeply involved in 
the mining industry. As the SLC later put it in their report to the Executive 
Committee of the Chamber of Mines: 
"Your committee recognise the value of the fact that 
the Directors of the Hatherley Company are gentlemen 
who are also largely interested in the Mining 
Industry, and believe that if some reasonable return 
could be assured to the Company in lieu of that trade 
which, however unjustifiably, its shareholders had 
from previous returns come to reckon upon as their 
due, the Chamber could count upon their loyal support 
in the direction indicated. l1 (182) 
Clearly, in the limited respect outlined above, the contradiction within the 
capitalist development of the Transvaal was a strength rather than a weakness. 
Working along the strength of this particular capitalist linkage, the SLC 
first tried to establish from the Hatherley board what price they wanted for the 
outright sale of the liquor concession. The Distillery directors made it clear that 
the sale of the factory would involve "a very large sum indeed", since the company had 
every prospect of monopoly profits until at least 1912. (183) Denied this most 
desirable solution of all, the SLC tried another approach. It offered to pay the 
Distillery an annual sum of £10,000 not "to manufacture the spirit now used in the 
native tradef1. (184) This proposal - whereby one set of capitalists envisaged paying 
another set of capitalists & to produce - revealed in stark outline the contradiction 
that beset economic development in the Transvaal. In fact, it was a contradiction of 
such a magnitude, and it would cost so much to resolve, that the mine-owners saw no 
reason why capital should pay for it. Instead, they proposed that the black working 
class should pay for its resolution! In their report back to the executive committee 
of the Chamber of Mines, the SLC suggested that the fee that Africans paid for passes 
should be raised from 1 shilling to 2 shillings. The state, after collecting this 
additional revenue from the workers, would then pass on the annual solatium of 
£10,000 to Hatherley. (185) 
When it had completed its preliminary enquiries and deliberations, the SLC 
passed on the above recommendation, as well as others for the reform of the liquor 
trade, to the state. This time it was the turn of the government and Samy Marks to 
be unenthusiastic. The major proposals of the SLC, like those of its predecessor 
the liquor comission, met with a quick death. The state, the liquor producers and 
the mining capitalists simply could not reach an agreement that would satisfy all 
parties, and, by June 1898, it was still a case of "business as usual" in the liquor 
industry. 
While "business as usual" had an obvious appeal for the Liquor Kings, the 
Volksraad were less than pleased. Members of the Raad were dismayed by the degree of 
corruption amongst the Zarps, and embarrassed by the flagrant violations of the law 
on the Witwatersrand. Although feeling somewhat frustrated by these realities, the 
Volksraad continued to make attempts at solving these problems. When the Raad debated 
the allended liquor law in 1898, it took the opportunity of calling in Cormnandant 
Schutte and severely reprhanding him about the poor police performance. But perhaps 
the most important step towards solving these problems came when Ih-uger replaced 
Dr van Leeuwen with J. C. Smuts as State Attorney. From mid-1898 onwards, Smuts 
applied himself to the problem of stamping out corruption amongst the Zarps. His 
immediate efforts were concentrated on the most senior levels of the police force. 
When Chief Detective Robert Ferguson was caught buying gold amalgam and passing it on 
to Count Sarigny in November '1898, Smuts arranged for his immediate dismissal. (186) 
Shortly after this, the officer in charge of the Illicit Liquor Department in the 
ZARP, Inspector Donovan, was also replaced. These and other changes in personnel 
followed until, by mid-1899, Smuts was satisfied*that he had reliable, efficient and 
uncorr~y3t officers at the head of the W .  Under the new Smuts regime, the post of 
Chief Detective was occupied by officer De Villiers, and the illicit liquor section 
was headed by Detective Thomas Menton. (187) 
These reforms, while welcome in themselves, did not go a long way in removing 
the fears and anxieties of the mine-owners. The changes in Z A D  personnel were 
largely confined to the most senior levels, and in the lower ranks, where salaries 
were small, police corruption remained a pervasive problem. In addition, the mining 
capitalists always feared the possibility of yet another Kruger initiative to get 
"total prohibition" lifted. Most serious of all, of course, was the fact that the 
Liquor Kings were continuing to undermine the productivity of black workers through 
the large-scale sale of spirits. These factors, as well as the rapidly escalating 
political tensions in the Transvaal during 1899, left the mining capitalists feeling 
decidedly nervous and insecure. Believing that the best form of defence was attack, 
the mine owners decided to launch a new ideological offensive. In April 1899, the 
first copies of an Eckstein & CO financed newspaper, the Transvaal Leader, were sold 
on the streets of Johannesburg. It was this newspaper that became the primary cudgel 
of the mining capitalists in the open class conflict that formed a prelude to the 
South African War. 
Almost from its very first issue, the Transvaal Leader set out on a "Liquor 
Crusade" against the business armies of the petit bourmoisie. Virtually every issue 
during May, June and July of 1899 contained some or other sensationalist exposure of 
the illicit liquor trade. No effort was spared in disclosing the names of those 
involved in the syndicates, and no attempt was made to conceal the hatred and contempt 
felt for their Teruvian" employees. The activities of the firms at the heart of 
the wholesale trade were well publicized, as were the practices of those who bottled 
various concoctions under the seal of forged labels. Newspaper readers were treated 
to detailed descriptions of defensive arrangements inside llPeruvian forts", and told 
of the exact nature of the linkage with the "adjacent stands". On several occasions, 
even the activities of mine and compound managers who were implicated in the illicit 
trade were reported. The Transvaal Leader also took it upon itself publicly to 
lecture Ehmmuel Mendelssohn, editor of the rival Standard and Diggers! News, about 
his llresponsibilitiesll to the "public11. 
On the face of it, the Transvaal Leaderrs campaign had every appearance of 
a no-holds-barred, full-scale expos6, for the benefit of the new court of "public 
opinionq1. Yet, amidst all these revelations about the liquor trade and the 
inefficiency of the state, there E one most significant omission. Not once, during 
all the months of the campaign, did the Leader devote so much as a single line to the 
activities of the liquor producers - the capitalists. At least one shrewd reader, 
W. S. Cohn, spotted the deliberate omission in the mine-ownerst game, and pointedly 
asked the editor: 
"But how is it that you have never shaped your enquiries 
in the direction of the llBigll syndicate here [Hatherley 
and the Alcohol  rust], as they are the people who are 
supplying all these illicit dealers with the liquor?" (188) 
Clearly, the mine-owners and their agents were at war with the petit bourgeoisie and 
not with the capitalists - especially when there happened to be an embarrassing 
overlap between liquor capitalists and mining capitalists. Eckstein & CO would have 
known the problem, as would the editor of the Leader (~amuel mans was a manager in 
the company g& on the board of Hatherley ~istillery) .
This class war of 1899 was not confined to an exchange of ideological 
munition in the editorial columns of the Transvaal Leader. Certainly, the editor 
and his principals had reasons for whipping llpublic opinion" into a frenzy on the 
"liquor questionl1, but they also wanted action. To this latter end the editor engaged 
the services of an ex-detective named Baxter. (189) Making full use of Baxterts 
expertise, the editorial staff of the Leader embarked on a programme of violence 
directed at the Liquor Kings and their l'Peruviansll. On Sunday mornings they would 
set out on carefully planned expeditions, and "rushf1 the illicit liquor dens. They 
succeeded in smashing thousands of bottles of spirits, tore down false partitions 
inside the "forts", and ripped out trapdoors. (190) This pioneering example of 
violence for the capitalist cause was soon followed by the mine managers themselves, 
who hired private detectives for the same purposes. (191) All this destruction and 
disruption placed the Liquor Kings on the defensive, assisted the mine-owners in their 
quest for a productive black labour force, and made excellent copy for the Monday 
morning edition of the Leader. 
Most of the justification offered for this open conffontation derived from 
a single incident which, fortunately enough for the Transvaal Leader, came very early 
on in its ??Liquor Crusadef1. On the 29th April 1899, Mrs Appelbe, wife of the Wesleyan 
minister in Fordsburg, and a companion by the name of Wilson, were viciously attacked 
by a gang of men while on their to choir practice at the local church. (192) The 
womants condition remained critical during the following days, and rumour had it that 
the Kings had paid gangsters to attack her because she had supplied information about 
their activities. (193) On the 2nd May, when her condition had further deteriorated, 
the Leader ran a sensational editorial entitled "Blood upon their hands", in which it 
openly accused the Kantor syndicate of Fordsburg of being behind the assault. (194) 
The sense of moral indignation which this aroused in the white public was complete 
when the ministerts wife died on the following day. (195) 
Despite the offer of a £500 reward by State Attorney Smuts for information 
leading to the prosecution of lks Appelbets assailants, no substantial evidence was 1 
ever offered to the police, and the criminals remained undetected. (196) The whole 
affair, however, helped stampede "public opinion" in the direction suggested by the 
Leader. Within days of the death there occurred a rash of public meetings. Local 
church congregations passed resolutions supporting the Transvaal Leader's campaign, 
and on 10th May a great public meeting was held in Johannesburg at which the illicit 
liquor trade was roundly condemned. (197) At the same meeting, ministers of religion 
sat astride their highest moral horses, striking out blindly at the enemy, and in the 
wake of the gathering at least one was sued for criminal libel by Emmanuel 
Mendelssohn. (198), Perhaps the most important meeting of all, however, took place in 
Potchefstroom on the 17th May. There the members of the Dutch Reformed Church met in 
formal session and decided to send a deputation to Pretoria to meet the State 
President about the illicit liquor trade. (199) 
Amidst all this pure-white moral outrage, however, there were also 
significant signs of black activity. African leaders, perhaps more concerned with 
the health and welfare of their black kinsmen than Mrs Appelbe, took the opportunity 
to mobilize their own followers. Amongst the names of these leaders, there were some 
that were to become prominent in the African political struggle of later decades. 
Saul Msane, compound manager at the Jubilee mine, and Sebastian Msimang were among 
the leaders who addressed an 800-strong working class gathering in the Wesleyan 
Native Church, Albert Street, on the 16th May 1899. Resolutions calling for "total 
pr~hibition~~ and strict enforcement of the law were passed, and, according to the 
Leader "It was remarkable that, although the boys working on the mines were largely 
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represented, there was not a single vote against the  resolution^^^. (200) On the 
following evening Msane was again active, this time as chairman of a meeting of 
"educated nativesf1 held at the Independent Presbyterian Church in the Braamfontein 
location. Here a similar set of resolutions were proposed by the Rev. Tsewu and 
accepted by the meeting. (201) The Transvaal Leader gleefully reported on these 
resolutions which so accurately mirrored the official Chamber of Mines lines on the 
liquor trade. 
With "public opinionf1 at fever pitch in a community already deeply anxious 
about the possibility of wax, there was always the danger that the llLiquor Crusade" 
would get completely out of hand, produce witch-hunting, nnd lead to indiscriminate 
violence. Since the attention of the was so ruthlessly fixed on the problem 
of the "Peru~ians~~, the Jewish community became particularly anxious. Jews knew and 
understood the syndrome at work all too well, and, on the 5th May, William Cohn wrote 
a letter to the editor of the Leader, warning him about the possible consequences of 
his policy: 
"In your effort to diminish this deplorable traffic 
there is a grave danger of creating a large amount of 
anti-semitic feeling, a feeling which I may safely 
say is already beginning to show signs of existence. 
The mischief caused by articles appearing in the 
Berlin Kreu Zeitung and the St Petersbug Novoe 
Vremia and Grazdanin is well within my memory. 
Surely there are sufficient existing troubles and 
disputes in this State without introducing another, 
which would bid fair to eclipse all others in the 
intensity of its race hatred." (202) 
Within ten days the Chief Rabbi, Dr Hertz, was in the middle of a controversy about 
Jewish involvement in the liquor trade, and desperately trying to pour oil on 
increasingly troubled waters. (203) 
In several cases, however, the warnings and cautions came too late. At the 
Rietfontein mine, the manager took it upon himself to administer a thrashing to a 
liquor seller,and was promptly discharged when the case was brought to court. (204) 
Egged on by the shrill cries of the Leader, the self-appointed vigilantes elsewhere 
set about prosecuting the war of the mine owners and also attacked the "Peruvian 
fortsv1. On Sunday 21st May, for example, the Wesleyan minister in Johannesburg, the 
Rev.Scholefield, led his congregation in an attack on a neighbouring shebeen. (205) 
More serious asld destructive were the series of not-so-mysterious fires that happened 
to break out in illicit liquor dens and hotels during May and June. (206) Carried on 
by the popular wave of hatred, African workers also took the opportunity to settle 
their debts with the nearest and most visible exploiters - the petit bourgeoisie. 
". .. at one of the mines 600 boys destroyed the 
illicit liquor store, together with all the 
elaborate equipment of electric alarms and signals 
with which the store and adjoining premises were 
fitted. The reason given by the natives for this 
action was that the store was too much of a 
temptation to them, so that all their money was 
spent on drink." (207) 
Again, the mine omers and the Leader must have been pleased with this working class 
action that tackled the "fortstf of the illicit liquor syndicates rather than the 
factory of the mining-cm-liquor capitalists. 
Withflpublic opinionf1 in high dudgeon, Smuts also saw the opportunity of 
push- more strongly in the direction which he had been moving. Knowing that Kruger 
would be on the defensive, the State Attorney gave his support to the Leader's "Liquor 
Crusadet1. (208) In Johannesburg, Smuts f S two public prosecutors, Broeksma and Mostyn 
Cleaver, both identified themselves with the newspaper campaign. (209) During the 
weeks that followed the State Attorney spent much of his time and energy in combatting 
the syndicates, and senior members of his new department set a personal example. When 
there were no prosecutions forthcoming from the Fordsburg district, the State 
Prosecutor, Dr Krause, cycled around the area in an effort to establish zihat was 
happening on the streets. (210) 
Much of the State Attorney's effort, however, was frustrated by the hi& 
level of corruption amongst the Zarps. In order to circumvent this problem, Smuts 
adopted a suggestion that had most recently been aired by the Chamber of Mines at a 
large public meeting on 15th May 1899. (211) Within Chief Detective De Villiers's 
department, he set up a special task force under the direction of Tjaart Kruger. (212) 
Men within the "specials11, such as Detective Goldberg, were selected because of their 
particular knowledge of the liquor traffic. It became the sole objective of this 
nucleus of uncorruptibles to smash the big syndicates. 
The initial response of the syndicates to the "Liquor Crusade" had been one 
of reasonably confident indifference. In the early days of the campaign the Lediker 
syndicate had even attempted a confidence trick, by taking representatives of the 
Transvaal Leader on a public relations tour of their legitimate business fronts. (213) 
After the Appelbe murder, however, the syndicates were forced into a more aggressive 
stand and they resorted to their trusted methods of threats, bribery and 
corruption. (214) Just when these methods seemed to be holding their own, the 
syndicates were confronted with this new, and most substantial challenge to date, the 
"specials". 
Early in June 1899, Tjaart Kruger received two threats in anonymous letters 
which warned him to take the greatest care if he intended extending his activities to 
Boksburg. The leader of the chose to interpret these letters as coming 
from King Nathanson himself, and decided to take up the challenge. On Saturday the 
3rd June, Kruger sent two of his Pretoria-based detectives, Heysteck and Pelser, to 
Johannesburg in the utmost secrecy. At Park Station they were met by Goldberg - a 
man who had personal knowledge of the way that the Nathanson family ran their 
business. From there the three detectives made their way to the South Rose Deep 
mine, where the manager supplied them with three compound "boys11 for trapping. From 
the mine the detectives and their "boys" set out for Nathanson's biggest "fortll - the 
one behind the Railway Hotel at Germiston, known to African workers as "Pudding". (215) 
At the I1fort1l the detectives supplied the compound "boys" with marked coins, 
and then sent them in as lttrapsfl to buy liquor. As soon as the "boyslt re-emerged with 
the alcohol, the detectives "rushed" the "fort1'. They made progress without l 
hindrance until they reached a final door, and there they were confronted not by 
Smooel himself but by Prince George Nathanson and no fewer than twenty lTeruvianll 
assistants. At this point the Prince warned the detectives that, living or dead, 
they would not be allowed into the heart of the "fortw, and a vigorous fight ensued. 
Unable to get at the masked money, the detectives decided to compromise by arresting 
the Prince and two of the "Peruvians" on a charge of obstructing the course of 
justice. The Prince was then dragged off to the local charge office shouting: 
"Look here you special bastards from Pretoria, I have 
more money than you think, I can cover you with 
money, and I shall g-o to Pretoria and you will all 
have to work for me at half-a-crow a day." (216) 
The detectives had missed the King, but George Nathanson and two employees 
subsequently appeared at the Boksburg Police Court, where they were each sentenced to 
a fine of £20 or 3 months! hard labour. (217) In late June it was rumoured that King 
Nathanson was so annoyed by the "treacherous" behaviour of Detective Goldberg in his 
sonls case that he was willing to pay 82,000 to get this "special into trouble". (218) 
The Kings were put on the defensive by this new, rather rigid arm of the 
state, and they were wary of the heavier sentences that were now being passed in the 
courts. (219) On the 4th July 1899, the entire syndicate network was shocked by the 
news of the latest state action. The sharpest operator of all on the Witwatersrand, 
the King of the Liquor Kings, Nathan Friedman, had been arrested by Chief Detective 
De Villiers, following a raid on the Wiltshire Bar. (220) Despite several attempts 
to pervert the course of justice, Friedman ultimately appeared in court and, in August, 
was sentenced to 10 months! imprisonment without the option of a fine. (221) This 
unprecedentedly harsh sentence left the syndicates sorry, the detectives delighted, 
and the Chamber reasonably content. At the August monthly meeting of the Chamber of 
Mines, Ecksteip, on behalf of the mine owners, paid public tribute to the ceaseless 
energy and recent success of the State Attorney and his Chief Detective. (222) 
The p m  of conten-hnent from the Chamber of Mines, however, proved to be 
somewhat premature. The ~lyndicates might have lost some important battles, but they 
had certainly not lost the war. Being in the front line they had taken a series of 
bad knocks, but their hidden allies, Kruger and the liquor producers, had been left 
relatively unscathed. The deep divisions within the Afrikaner ruling class on the 
liquor question always left the syndicates with the hope that they would be rescued 
by government forces that fought behind the lines. From June 1899 onwards, they 
increasingly placed their faith in those allies. Pretoria might have been the seat 
of the State Attorney and the hated "specials", but it was also the home of the State 
President. 
In the wake of the Appelbe murder and the public meetings to which it gave 
rise, several deputations made their way to Pretoria. Of these deputations, the most 
important was one headed by the Dutch Reformed Church in mid-May. (223) On Thursd-ay 
25th May, 1899, the Rev. Louw and 300 members of the church assembled in Pretoria to 
petition the State President about the liquor traffic. At the state buildings the 
deputation was met by the noted enemy of Hatherley Distillery, the Chairman of the 
Second Volksraad, H. P. Steenkamp. (224) Steenkamp thanked the church for the work 
that it had done in fighting the liquor evil. He also infomed the deputation that 
the Raad had decided to establish yet another liquor commission to examine the whole 
problem, and that the State President would hear them personally. At this point 
General Piet Joubert arrived to offer the State Presidentts apologies - his health 
did not allow him to meet the churchmen on such a cold morning! (225) 
Clearly, Khger was less than keen to meet the anti-liquor deputation. The 
churchmen, however, were not shrugged off that easily, and that evening they re- 
grouped with several representatives of the mining industry. At 7.00 p.m. the 
enlarged deputation marched down Church Street towards the State President's home. 
Unable to avoid the burghers any longer, Kruger met their spokesmen and curtly 
infomed them that he was entirely opposed to the present liquor laws, and that the 
best way around the whole problem was to create a state monopoly along the lines of 
the Gothenburg system. (226) These answers apparently still did not satisfy the 
churchmen,who then asked to meet the President separately. 
Kruger met the churchmen again at the Ekecutive Council Chambers at 9.00 p.m. 
He told members of the deputation that he sympathized with their good intentions, but 
that he was still of the opinion that a state liquor monopoly was the best solution to 
the problem. (227) Somewhat wearied by the whole day's anti-liquor agitation, the 
State President then proceeded to express his considerable annoyance to the Rev. Louw. 
He complained bitterly that the deputation had hampered certain approaches that he 
planned to make to the Raad, and that the Uitlanders in the Transvaal would make great 
political capital of the fact that they undertook their agitations on the day of the 
Queen! S birthday! (228) 
As soon as news of the Raadts new liquor commission got out, the syndicates 
switched their attention from Johannesburg to Pretoria. Knowing that Kruger and the 
liquor capitalists favoured a state monopoly in which Hatherley was to be the sole 
producer, they lobbied to have "total prohibitiont1 lifted. A mere two weeks after 
Nathan Friedman had been sentenced, the Kings succeeded in getting the information 
that they had longed for. On 26th August 1899, a disgusted Transvaal Leader told its 
readers that : 
"The syndicates are boasting of approaching changes in 
the Law as if they were as good as accomplished 
already, and they seem to know the mind of the Raad 
Liquor Commission before even that body has reported 
to the Raad. Prohibition, it is said, is to go by 
the (229) 
A week later, the commission reported to the Raad. It suggested that 
prohibition be lifted, that Africans be entitled to two drinks a day - one in the 
morxling and one in the evening - but that nobody should be allowed to sell a black 
man a bottle of liquor. (230) These findings no doubt delighted the syndicates. The 
Kings would have known that if the proposals for what amounted to a new industrial dop 
system ever came into being, then they would be able to expand their empires through 
the loopholes that they were bound to find in the new legislation. 
At the same time, and for the same reasons, these findings must have been 
bitterly disappointing and deeply frustrating to the mine-owners. As the clouds of 
war threatened to break and the mining capitalists scurried for the protection of Cape 
Town, they could look back not on three years of "total prohibitionf1 but on three 
years of total frustration. What the Volksraad and the law had so faithfully promised 
them in 1896, the Liquor Kings, the "Peruvians" and the Zarps had denied them over the 
succeeding years. Economic roots which dated back to at least the 1880s had given rise 
to a political plant whose foliage had become hopelessly entangled. Every time that 
the stem of the alliance between the Chamber of Mines and the Volksraad was pulled in 
one direction, that of the State President and the liquor capitalists moved in another - 
and all the time the parasitic liquor syndicates continued to bloom. The mine-owners 
knew that, as long as Kruger and Hatherley Distillery lasted, they would be confronted 
by a stalemate situation in which Witwatersrand Africans would be both liquor consumers 
and unproductive workers. They also knew that while there was war there was hope. 
The Black Worker as Worker: the Spoils of War for the Mine-Owners, 1899-1903 
Prohibition, the "specials" and the "Liquor Crusadef1 of the Transvaal Leader 
all helped to make 1899 one of the less successful years for Hatherley Distillery. l 
Yet, despite the outbreak of the war in October, which further undermined business, l 
the Pretoria factory continued to manufacture spirits, and at the end of the year 
manag-ed to show a profit of iE2,737. (231) South Africa, financial journal and 
capitalist mouthpiece in the City of London, assured its readers that, given the l 
circumstances, "this result cannot be regarded as other than satisfactory". (232) l 
Under Sammy Marks's skilful financial tutelage, the trading year for 
Hatherley in l9OO was no less satisfactory - again given the circumstances. 
Catering for the climate of insecurity, Marks arranged for a sum of £25,000 to be 
taken out of the Distillery's funds, and secured as a special investment. (233) 
Even after this had been done, the Distillery still showed a gross profit of over 
£16,000 for the twelve months, and, althou& the shareholders were not paid a 
dividend, they had every reason to be content with an enterprise that could point to 
a net profit of over £9,000 in such trying times. (234) 
A trading year, however, was not the same as twelve months of war, and, 
viewed from other perspectives, l9OO was not a good year for the Pretoria company. 
Early in the year there had been a considerable amount of fighting in the vicinity of 
the factory, and the company was fortunate that very little permanent W a g e  was done 
to the plant and equipment. (235) But once Pretoria fell to the British forces on 
5th June, damage of a more lasting type was done to the Distillery. Under Martial 
Law, the Military Governor issued a proclamation prohibiting the manufacture and sale 
of all spirituous liquors. (236) Under the same order, Samr@y Marks was forced to 
close the glass factory at Hatherley and this meant dismissal for all the employees. 
This latter action involved the company in further losses, since all the skilled 
workers were on contract and demanded compensation for their enforced redundancy. (237) 
The Hatherley directors sharply contested these decisions, but their combination of 
threat and plea left the Military Governor totally unmoved. It was this early 
proclamation that was to give the first indication of how the imperial authorities 
were to view the liquor industry and trade in their newly acquired mining colony. 
Initially, the liquor capitalists were not greatly perturbed by the long 
term consequences of this closure. Their ultimate confidence was reflected in the 
press release which the London Committee issued to shareholders: 
"This cessation of business, however, is only of a 
temporary nature, and when things have settled down 
there is every reason to anticipate that under the 
British Flag the Company will have a bright and 
prosperous future. l1 (238) 
Six, sixteen, and twenty-six months later, the Distillery and the glass factory were 
still closed llin obedience to proclamations issued by military authoritiesf1. (239) 
In the end, Hatherley Distillery never did reopen - a fate which the Transvaal mines 
certainly did not share, and which will be recounted below. At some point in time 
between June lgOO and February 1903, British and other shareholders made the 
relatively painful discovery that the imperial army had fou&t a war for mine and not 
distillery owners. 
The closure of Hatherley in June 1900 did not dramatically disrupt the 
liquor trade on the Witwatersrand during the first nine or ten months of the war. 
Existing stocks, and a much reduced but continuing supply of liquor from the Pretoria 
Distillery were sufficient to keep the syndicates in business. Black workers 
continued to buy, at new and even more exorbitant prices, the only "cheapf1 liquor they 
could afford - Hatherley spirits, or llNellmapiusll as it was more commonly known. Both 
the syndicates and the black workers, however, got a foretaste of the imminent new 
dispensation when the ZAR government took over the running of five mines in April 
1900. The wages of the 12,000 black miners were unilaterally reduced from 60 to 20 
shillings per month, and the ZAR war administration further illustrated its no-nonsense 
capitalist approach by cancelling all liquor licences in the vicinity of the mines.(240) 
More glimmering's in the capitalist new dawn were to be seen soon after the 
British forces occupied Johannesburg on the 31st M a y  1900. Martial Law was declared, 
and within a month a syndicate leader was arrested and made an example of: 
ll. . . a certain Jof fe Eprobably Barry, who was based at 
Krugersdorp] known on the Rand as the Liquor King, 
was sentenced to a heavy fine and several years' 
imprisonment, with the result that the whole trade 
was paralysed. l' (241) 
In fact, the whole trade was not "paralysed'l, but the Kings had received a near fatal 
blow. Further problems for the liquor syndicates materialized as the army swept 
thro- Johannesburg, rounding up "undesirable immigrantst1. These lumpen proletarians 
from Russia, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain and France were unceremoniously bundled 
onto trains and despatched to Cape Town. There, at least one party of 150 was put 
aboard the Hawarden Castle and sent to Europe. (242) Amongst these "undesirable 
immigants" of July-August there were probably several vPeruviansll, and this further 
undermined the illicit liquor business. In September it was reported that shebeens 
had "been pretty well stamped out by the heavy penalties imposed". (243) The illicit 
liquor business, however, was never entirely eradicated - not even under the harsh 
regime of Martial Law. In February 1901, Colonel Davis, the Military Comissioner of 
Police, was still having to devote a part of his day to the illicit liquor business.(244) 
In general, however, there was no doubt that the Witwatersrand was becoming a better 
place for minimg companies. 
From their wartime base in Cape Town, the mine-owners watched the 
achievements of the Imperial army with admiration. The closure of Hatherley, the 
trial of Joffe and the deportation of the flundesirablesll were gifts that only a war 
could give so swiftly and generously. In less than three months the Military 
Governor had succeeded in achieving what the Chamber of Mines and the Volksraad had 
failed to accomplish in three years. The joy of the mine-owners, however, was the 
joy of caution. They knew that the Transvaal would not always be under Martial Law, 
and that the British army would not a l w ~ s  be there to do the work of the state. 
What they had to do, therefore, was to ensure that the gains of war did not become 
the losses of peace. To this end, they spent their seaside days lobbying the imperial 
administration and building up an ideological offensive against any future legislation 
which might allow alcohol to be sold to black men in the Transvaal. The ghost of the 
Raadts 1899 liquor commission continued to haunt the Chamber of Mines in its new home. 
In July 1900, a mere four weeks after Johannesburg had been occupied, a 
large deputation of mine-owners and commercial men approached the then Governor of the 
Cape, Sir Alfred Milner. The mining men outlined the pre-war liquor problem on the 
Witwatersrand to Milner in some detail, and expressed their wish that "total 
prohibition" be maintained and effectively enforced. Milner gave the deputation a 
most sympathetic hearing and assured the businessmen that whoever took over the 
Transvaalts affairs after the war would probably be capable of clearing up the entire 
liquor question to their satisfaction within six months. (245) 
A nod and a wink from a Governor - even a British Governor - did not 
completely satisfy mining capitalists who had unsuccessfully fought the liquor industry l 
and trade for at least half a decade. What would Sa;mmy Marks and the producers of 
"Cape Smoke" do once business was resuscitated and they got access to the markets of 
a united South Africa? For this and other reasons, the men of the Chamber of Mines 
threw their weight behind a new organization that emerged exactly at the time that the 
Transvaal was making the transition from a military to a civilian administration. 
"The South African Alliance for the Reform of the Liquor Traffict1 united "men keenly 
interested in the moral and material welfare of South Africa, mine owners, mine 
managers, merchants, ministers of religion and private citizens". (246) 
It would appear that within the Alliance the men interested in the "material 
welfare of South Africa" made considerable use of those interested in the llmoral 
welfare" of the country. It was the ministers of religion who undertook most of the 
agitation and public relations for the l1AllianceW - men like the Rev. Andrew Brown and 
the Rev. J. I. Darragh, the founder of St Johnts College in Johannesburg. During June 
and July of l9Ol they wrote articles at home and abroad outlining the aims and 
objectives of the movement. (247) 
First;, ,the Alliance wished to seize the moment and secure the victories 
that the Military Governor had achieved. As the good Rev. Darragh put it to his 
English audience: 
"Reforms which it would be well-nigh impossible to 
introduce into an old and complex civilisation can 
now and here be attempted with every prospect of 
success, and with the minimum of opposition and 
friction. We are making a fresh start, and it will 
be some compensation for the sufferings of the last 
two years if that start is made on sane, well- 
considered lines. We have perfect confidence in the 
ability, integrity and honesty of purpose of the 
Administration, but amid the multiplicity of claims 
which will be clamouring for attention, it is just 
possible that this golden opportunity for settling 
the liquor problem ma;y be overlooked till it is too 
late. l1 (248) 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, the Alliance sought a state monopoly for the 
production and sale of liquor. (249) 
The idea of a state monopoly of this sort was not new to the mine-owners - 
indeed, it was very similar to the Emger proposals of 1898-99. This time, however, 
the mining capitalists knew that it would be in a state where they had greater power, 
and that it would be backed by an administration that could more effectively guarantee 
the productivity of their black workers. In fact, the mine-owners had such confidence 
in the administrative ability of the incoming power that many hankered after the old 
industrial dop system of pre-1897. With British backing, the use of alcohol as a 
means of socio-economic control again became a real possibility. The Alliance 
therefore did& favour total prohibition. Again, the capitalists left it to the 
churchmen to explain. The Rev. Darragh told an English audience that was perhaps not 
fully familiar with the history and reality of the industry what exactly the mine- 
owners contemplated: 
lVkn,y thoughtful persons feel that the mining native 
should be specially considered. His work, especially 
underground, is disagreeable, monotonous and exhausting. 
The East Coast natives in particular [~ozambicans], who 
furnish the largest number of underground workers, are 
used to stimulants from boyhood, and it seems unfair to 
deprive them altogether of what they regard as a solace . . ." (250) 
Like other clergymen in the Alliance, the Rev. Darragh was capable of doing a more than 
passable imitation of a Minister of Mines. 
As the Transvaal moved from military administration to imperial government, 
the mine-owners had therefore backed two possibilities in a win/win combination that 
guaranteed dividends. Either they could get 'ltotal prohibition", which would secure 
for them a productive labour force, or they could get the right to use alcohol as a 
lever of socio-economic control over the workers in a regime backed by an efficient 
administration. All that remained was the 'lanxiousfl wait to see whether their line 
through Milner, or the one t h r o u  the South African Alliance, would triumph. In 
practice, the wait turned out to be less than nerve-racking, and the transitional 
period was relatively untraumatic for mining capitalists. 
In April 1901, within weeks of his arrival in Pretoria as High Commissioner, 
Alfred Milner was petitioned by the South African Alliance on the liquor question. 
The Alliance again underlined the benefits that had come with Mastial Law, and urged 
strong government control. For his part, Milner expressed sympathy with the new 
movement, and suggested that they also approach Joseph Chamberlain. Additional 
pxessure on the Secretary of State for the Colonies would have been a neat supplement 
to the Alliancels already well advanced public agitation in England. (251) Having 
yet again expressed his understanding of the mining capitalistsl problems, Milner set 
to work on his task of reconstruction. 
In October 1901, Milner set up the Liquor Licensing Commission in 
Johannesburg to govern the resumption of the retail liquor trade. (252) As chairman 
of the commission he appointed a Yeomanry officer, Major Macpherson, and to assist 
the chairman a committee of Johannesburg businessmen. This military-cum-civilian 
licensing board was designed to produce exactly the type of conservative change that 
Milner and the mine-owners envisaged. Initially it kept all bars, canteens, and 
bottle stores closed, and only allowed liquor to be sold in hotels and restaurants 
between 12 noon and 9 p.m. 
This, the most modest of possible starts to the retail liquor trade, Milner 
made even safer in the best way he knew possible. On the 10th December 1901, he used 
his powers of proclamation as High Commissioner to gazette the new liquor laws for the 
Transvaal. (253) This proclamation embodied the principle of "total prohibitionf1 for 
Africans, and laid down stiffer penalties for the contravention of the law than had 
existed under the old ZAR government. Milner saw this law as a gift which would 
benefit all the classes most closely involved in reconstruction on the Rand. As he 
proudly wrote to Chamberlain: 
' l . . .  undoubtedly the greatest benefit which it is 
in the power of the Government to confer, alike 
upon mine owner and native, is the suppression of 
the illicit drink traffic." (254) 
But, to put the issue beyond doubt, this proclamation was followed by Ordinance 32 of 
1902 which prevented the distillation of any spirits for commercial gain within the 
Transvaal. (255) 
Between them, these measures ensured an orderly transition to liquor 
retailing and limited the opportunities for illicit dealers. When the bars reopened 
in Johannesburg in January 1902, they had to operate within restricted hours and serve 
a meal of some sort with any alcohol they served. (256) Liquor licences came under 
the control of the Imperial Liquor Commissioner, and, except for a brief period of 
public drunkenness when the bottle stores reopened in mid-1902, there were no major 
disruptions on the Witwatersrand. In December 1901, Milner noted with pleasure the 
mine-owners' claim that only one per cent of their black work force was now absent 
owing to liquor on any one dqy, as opposed to the 10 to 15 per cent average during 
the pre-war years. (257) That increased productivity, coupled with the newly reduced 
wage rates for African workers, left the mine-owners comparatively happy. The Transvaal 
was becoming safe for mining capitalism. 
The happiness of the m i n i n g  capitalists in this case, however, was the 
sorrow of the liquor capitalists. The collapse of the retail liquor trade with 
Africans, the thoroughness of the British "reforms" and the closure of Hatherley 
Distillery, all left Sammy Marks and his colleagues far from satisfied. Marks's 
financial acumen, the concession, and the large number of British shareholders in the 
distillery all meant that Milner could not simply brush the liquor capitalists aside. 
In mid-1901 South Africa warned Milner that he should not see the Pretoria business 
as simply another Kruger concession, like the railways or dymnite: 
"The Hatherley Distillery has all along been an 
honest concern, with an honourable management, and 
as such is entitled to the highest consideration at 
the hands of the new Transvaal authorities." (258) 
To make the new revolution of the mining capitalists secure, the British administration 
had to eliminate the Pretoria distillery at the same time that it was "reforming" the 
Rand. 
Within twelve months of the outbreak of war in October 1900, the imperial 
government had appointed the Transvaal Concessions Commission to examine the 
monopolies granted by the ZAR. In October 1900, Sammy Marks and his colleagues gave 
evidence before the commission in Pretoria, stressing that the concession had been 
legally granted and that the company had kept to all the conditions attached to the 
grant. (259) When the commission reported in June 1901, it found accordingly and 
recommended that if the concession were cancelled the owners be compensated. (260) 
As soon as the commission reported, Samqy Marks authorized Isaac Lewis to 
undertake the detailed negotiations leading up to compensation. As a figure less 
closely identified with Rmger than Marks, Lewis proved to be a wise choice. Between 
June l9Ol and early 1903 he worked ceaselessly in his efforts to extract the best 
possible settlement for the Hatherley shareholders. In particular, Lewis had two 
related objectives. First, he aimed to get a settlement as soon as possible - an 
objective that was basic to the shareholders' interest. Secondly, he was intent on 
getting a settlement with the Milner regime rather than the Legislative Council 
which would follow it - the British might be more generous than the businessmen, 
given the origins of the capital involved. 
By the end of 1902 Lewis had wrapped up his negotiations with the Milner 
administration, and in February 1903 details of the settlement were printed in the 
Hatherley Directors' Report for 1902. From the distilleryls point of view, the 
settlement appeared to be a relatively generous one. The shareholders were to be 
paid a cash settlement of over a quarter of a million pounds for the cancellation of 
the concession. In addition, stocks on hand could be sold exempt of excise duty, 
and some of the liquor at the Ressano Garcia and Louren~o Marques distilleries was to 
be allowed to be imported duty free. In London, South Africa told British investors 
in the distillery that "shareholders are to be congratulated on the result of the 
negotiations". (261) 
When these basic conditions were confirmed in the Legislative Council in 
July 1903 not everybody was pleased with the settlement. "Several members severely 
criticized the bargain, which passed only because the Government was already committed 
to the (262) The resolution of the contradiction within the capitalist 
development of the Transvaal had to be paid for, and not all were happy with the 
asking price. In this case, however, the m i n i n g  capitalists1 and tax payers' sorrow 
was the distillers' joy. Why exactly Marks aYld his colleagues were so satisfied 
emerged from the detailed analysis of the settlement which South Africa offered 
shareholders : 
"According to the balance-sheet made up to December 31, 
1902, the total assets stood at £600,000, against 
liabilities mounting to £475,000. At this time, the 
concession and goodwill stood in the accounts as 
representing £116,319 7s. 5d., which must now, in 
consequence of the amount the Government has agreed to 
pay, be increased by £180,555 12s. 7d., or a little 
- - .  
over £1 12s. 6d. per share. In addition to this, the 
.cornany will, considering the very favourable conditions 
gr&ted them; undoubtedly make a iarge profit on the 
sale of the 320,000 gallons of liquor they have in stock, 
so that when the affairs of the company come to be 
finally liquidated, the return made to holders of shares 
should be an extremely mod one. To the fact that they 
to-day in this very satisfactory position, shareholders 
are to a very great extent indebted to M r  Isaac Lewis . . ." (263) 
No wonder that the financial journal could take a broad perspective and conclude: 
"At this result, holders of shares in this the first industrial company formed in the 
Transvaal have nothing of which to complain." (264) The owners of Hatherley Distillery 
went out of business with a smile, if not a chuckle. 
Conclusion 
The production of an agricultural surplus has always occupied a central role 
in the historical development of pre-capitalist modes of production into a capitalist 
mode of production. At very least, the inhabitants of the new towns and the 
emerging proletariat have to be fed by the food produced on the land. The capacity 
to rpoduce this agricultural surplus during the transformation to capitalism, 
however, has varied significantly, as has the capacity of the emerging social 
formation to absorb it. In general,though, it would seem accurate to suggest that 
the economic history of European capitalism is as much punctuated by the absence of 
an agricultural surplus as by its presence. It is largely, although not solely, for 
this reason that rising prices, starvation and food riots occupy such an important 
chapter in European history. (265) 
Having noted that broad pattern, however, the economic and social 
historian should also pa~r close attention to those cases in which a substantial 
agricultural surplus generated. In Europe, as elsewhere, many reasons could 
possibly account for such a surplus, and often the contributing factors were 
regionally specific - the cost of labour, technological innovation, land utilization, 
land distribution, etc. For the present analysis, however, it is not simply the 
genesis or size of the surplus that should be noted but its quality. Here it is 
important to realize that agricultural commodities in some respects had almost unique 
properties during the transition to capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries. Unlike I 
such commodities today, fresh produce could not be stored for relatively lengthy 1 l 
periods, transformed into tinned varieties, or instantly transported across vast 
distances to assured markets. During the European transition to capitalism, therefore, 
the producer was faced with a more substantial loss if he could not dispose of his 
agricultural surplus - the contemporary producer, of course, still suffers from the 
same problem to an extent. Historically, it was for this reason that producers sought 
ways of storing the value of their commodities or minimizing the loss they were likely 
to sustain. In this search, distillation presented itself as one obvious solution. 
Throw distillation, agricultural surplus was converted into spirits and not only was 
part of its value maintained but in some cases the price actually increased as the 
commodity matured. Thus, when the Porte prohibited the export of corn from the 
~umani&provinces in the 18th century, the landlords turned to distillation and sold 
their spirits on markets which they created within the country. Similarly, when the 
Junkers of Prussia were faced with a massive increase in their potato yields, they 
turned to distilling spirits which they unloaded on the less discriminating colonial 
markets of the late 19th century. It is within this broad perspective that we have 
to attempt to understand the emergence and decline of the Transvaal alcohol industry 
between 1880 and 1903. 
By the late 1870s and emly 1880s, Transvaal farmers were already capable 
of producing a sizable surplus of grain and, in the villages and towns of the country, 
there was a well developed taste for beer and spirits. A considerable number of 
districts were p i n  exporting, and the number of liquor licences issued in urban 
areas could be quite considerable. In 1870, 32 liquor licences were issued in 
Potchefetroom, 17 in Pretoria, 15 in Wakkerstroom, and 5 in Heidelberg. (266) The I 
presence of this agricultural surplus, albeit periodic and somewhat regionally based, 
together with a market for alcohol, provided an opportunity for capital accumulation 
through distillation. When A. H. Nellmapius got a monopoly for the manufacture of 
grain spirits from Kimger in 1881, there was every prospect of the business being 
modestly successful, and of the Transvaal setting out on a well trodden path to slow 
capitalist development. 
Unlike Europe, however, the Transvaal did not have to pass through the 
relatively prolonged and g~adual lfdecline of feudalism and growth of towns1' on its way 
to the objective of national capital accumulation. The discovery of the Witwatersrand 
in the mid-1880s and the existence of capital in Europe seeking new outlets combined 
dramatically to compress capitalist development in the Transvaal. In the mushrooming 
towns of the Witwatersrand, Hatherley Distillery found a market which expanded by at 
least ten times in as many years. What was going to be a modestly successful 
business in the early 1880s was a spectacularly successful £% million industry by the 
mid-1890s. The motor force behind this accelerated development was gold, and in the 
end the mining industry both made and bmke Hatherley Distillery. 
To ensure the success of their capitalist revolution, the mine-owners needed 
a proletariat. In particular, they needed the service of a growing a m y  of black 
workers who would labour for the low wages that made gold mining on the Rand 
economically feasible, and for this they turned to Mozambique. There they found a 
territory which the Portuguese had economically exploited for decades, and a 
population which was considerably addicted to the vast quantities of cheap alcohol 
which the metropolis unloaded on its satellite. The Randlords discovered to their 
delight that Mozambique was "ripe" for rapid proletariaaization, and that they could 
use the products of Hatherley Distillery in that process. In 1906, F. Perry, a 
prominent official in the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, could look back on 
the 1890s with some contentment and note how capitalism fed on underdevelopment. He 
observed that black Mozambicans "have always been fond of strong drinkn, and 
continued: 
"They brew themselves many kinds of native spirits, 
and the potent liquors of European manufacture threw 
open to them new vistas of enjoyment. A few of them 
had feund their way to the diamond fields. To the 
Witwatersrand gold fields, which were nearer to them 
they came in great numbers, especially after the 
construction of the Delagoa B a y  Railww. Their 
earnings were spent, not on cattle but on whisQ and 
gin. Thus, a period of work, instead of supplying 
them with the means of settling down, only gave them 
a period of drink and idleness. Afterwards they had 
to return to work in order to earn the coin wherewith 
to gratify their cultivated taste. In this way they 
have come nearer than any of the other South African 
races to supplying the material of an industrial, as 
distinguished from an agricultural population." (267) 
In the light of this, it can be appreciated why it was that during the early years on 
the Rand many mine managers ran the equivalent of an industrial "dop system" for their 
workers, and why it was that the Chamber of Mines moved so slowly and reluctantly 
towards an official policy that supported "total prohibition1'. It was for this same 
reason that a considerable number of mining capitalists continued to agitate for the 
right of African workers to have access to alcohol after the South African War. (268) 
It was the presence of large numbers of black miners that ensured the 
success of Hatherley Distillery, and success attracted capital - including mining 
capital. As the "Eerste Fabriek" in the industrializing republic, Hatherley presented 
not only the first opportunity for capital to diversify its holdings but also a most 
profitable investment. When the Distillery Company went public in 1892, it certainly 
attracted imperial capital, but it also secured a significant amount of national 
capital that had been werated in the mining industry and which now sought further 
local profits. Individual mining capitalists such as Marks, Lewis, ATans, Epler and 
Erlich, all had substantial investments in the distillery. So too diid members of the 
emerging bourgeoisie - men like F. Dormer who edited the and occupied a seat on 
the executive of the Chamber of Mines. (269) In addition, several of the channels 
which routed investment from the international money markets to the Reef also directed 
capital towards the distillery. Maqy an Ehglish and French investor who had holdings 
in mining also had shares in a profitable distillation business in Pretoria. 
The early policy of selling alcohol to African workers, however, contained 
within it the seeds of a problem for capitalist development which, in time, were to 
germinate into a full scale contradiction. As a growing market for the sale of 
spirits, the Witwatersrand started to attract competition in the early 1890s. Liquor 
capitalists elsewhere, but particularly in Germany and Mozambique, found ways of 
circumventing Hatherley's monopoly and flooding the market with even cheaper spirits. 
The Pretoria distillery in turn was forced to lower its prices. Falling prices 
increased the workers, consumption of cheap alcoholic poisons, and by 1895 it was 
reaching proportions that were becoming cripplingly counter-productive to the dominant 
mining industry. Black workers were getting so much uncontrolled access to alcohol 
that between 15 and 25 per cent of the labour force was permanently incapable of 
working. This forced the mine-owners to increase their complements by a similar 
proportion and escalated mining costs. This contradiction was made even more 
pronoqced and ironic by the fact that several prominent mining capitalists had 
shares in the distillery. In effect the situation had been reached by 1895 where 
the left hand of the mine owner sold liquor to the worker while the right hand 
attempted to =strain his consumption. 
The left hand proved to be stronger than the right. In 1896, the Chamber 
of Mines decided to cut its losses and. opt for a new official policy of "total 
prohibitionft. The mine-owners calculated that the loss of alcohol as a socio-economic 
lever over the work force would be more than compensated for by the profits that would 
come from a fully productive and reduced complement of African miners. In its quest 
for this new policy and the profits it would bring, the Chamber of Mines exploited 
divisions within the Afrikaner ruling class and in 1896, against the State President's 
wishes, the Volksraad passed the "total prohibitionr1 law. 
What for the mine-owners promised to be a golden age of "total prohibitionf1 
after 1897 turned out to be an era of total frustration between 1897 and 1899. Large 
and powerful illicit liquor syndicates emerged along the entire industrial spine of 
the Witwatersrand. Several of the TCings" and "Peruvians" in these well organized 
gangs probably had earlier experience of the liquor trade in Europe, and they made 
certain that black miners continued to get access to the alcohol they desired, albeit 
at suitably inflated prices. The weakness of the state and the venality of its 
officials during this period of primary capital accumulation left the empires of the 
Liquor Kings relatively unscathed - despite a vigorous counter-attack by the 
government and the mine-owners in late 1899. The frustration of the mine-owners 
reached such a pitch by 1898 that they attempted to erect a scheme whereby Hatterley 
Distillery would be paid not to produce spirits designed for African consumption. 
This plan, however, proved to be unacceptable to the distillery owners and the state. 
The single most important obstacle that blocked the advance of the mining 
capitalists on the "liquor question" was the alliance between the State President and 
the distillery owners. Both of these parties were completely opposed to the Volksraad 
sanctioned policy of "total prohibition". The Distillery owners saw it as an 
unnecessary curtailment of profits, and a violation of the concession that the state 
had granted them at an earlier date. Kruger had personal business dealings with 
Hatherley, saw the distillery as an important grain market for his burgher constituents, 
and felt Eerste Fabrieken to be an important part of his strategy for industrial 
development. The State President thus appointed liquor commissions in 1898 and 1899 
and both recommended that "total prohibition" be lifted. When the mine-owners left 
for Cape Town on the eve of the war  in 1899, they departed with the spectre of legal 
alcohol sales to black workers haunting them. The contradiction in capitalist 
development had remained intact. 
From their war-time coastal base, the mine-owners lobbied the Imperial 
authorities about the "liquor question" on the Witwatersrand. In particular, they 
sought assurances that "total prohibitiont1 would be enforced once British power could 
make its presence felt. To assist in the achievement of this objective, the mine- 
owners also took part in a front organization for public agitation, called the South 
African Alliance for the Reform of the Liquor Traffic. 
While the mining capitalists were agitating, the imperial arnry was acting. 
Making use of Martial Law, the Military Governor of the invading forces at once 
attacked the illicit liquor trade on the Witwatersrand. The severe penalties imposed 
during a wetime situation, and enforced by an occupying army, proved to be a fatal 
blow to the liquor Kings. The syndicates received their final setback when the arnry 
swept through the streets of Johannesburg, rounding up "undesirable immigrants" - some 
of them "Peruvians" - and arranging for them to be deported to Europe. The most 
lasting solution of all, however, came when the a r m ~ r  occupied Pretoria. Within days I 
of the occupation, the Military Governor ordered the closure of Hatherley Distillery 
and its glass factory. De Eerste Fabrieken never reopened. 
In effect, the war had achieved within months what the Volksraad and the 
Chamber of Mines had been unable to attain in years of struggle. On their return to 
Johannesburg, the mining capitalists sought to secure the made under the 
military regime. In these attempts they enjoyed the active co-operation of the 
incoming British administration under Milner. Milner made use of the military presence 
in Johannesburg to ensure a gradual and extremely cautious resumption of the retail 
liquor trade. In practice, this transition to a civilian administration of the law 
was effectively backed by new and rigorous legislation. Milner used his powers of 
proclamation to issue legislation which incorporated the principle of "total 
prohibition" for blacks, and which outlined heavy penalties for contravention of the 
law. This was almost immediately followed by further legislation which effectively 
prevented the distillation of spirits for commercial gain in the Transvaal. The 
illicit sale of liquor to black miners never again became a problem on the 
Witwatersrand on a scale remotely comparable to the pre-war era. 
All these developments left the British administration with only one more 
problem to solve - how to achieve a settlement with the owners of Hatherley Distillery. 
A commission set up to examine the problem recommended that the concession granted to 
the owners be cancelled, and that the owners be compensated. By the end of 1902 the 
terms of settlement between the owners and the government were decided upon, and during 
1903 the shareholders were paid compensation that even the financial journals of the 
City of London considered to be generous. 
Within thirty-six months the British administration had closed the 
Distillery and compensated its owners, passed legislation to prevent any further 
distilling;, smashed the illicit liquor syndicates, and rendered the entire black work- 
force on the Rand more efficient and productive on their newly reduced wages. The 
contradiction within the Transvaalrs capitalist development had been resolved, and the 
dominant mining industry had emerged triumphant. The British army and Milner had made 
the Witwatersrand safe for national and international capitalism. 
So, if Thomas Welsh reall$- wished to know why Africans in Lagos were allowed 
to drink as much liquor as they liked while those in the Transvaal were llprotectedll 
by total prohibition, then he need not have asked his question of the imperial 
administrators. He might have asked in the Rand Club, or in the City of London. 
Members there would have told him that colonial liquor laws had not to do with morals, 
but with money. Peasants were not workers. Not yet. 
Notes 
No researcher is ever in the position of being able to say, like the pavement artist, 
Itall my own workf1. This is especially true of this essay, and I am indebted to many 
people for their help. I would like to thank Martin Legassick, Stanley Trapido and 
Belinda Bozzoli for discussions with them, and for making research material available 
to me. thanks are also due to G. Clarence-Smith, Juan Esteban, Wolf Mersch and 
George Boshyk - their excellent Portuguese, German and Ukrainian I have distorted to 
my own ends. 
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